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"Entrenchment" Under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act: An Approach for Analyzing Conglomerate
Mergers*
Lawrence K. Hellman**
INTRODUCTION
While economists continue to debate whether the American
economy is becoming significantly more concentrated,' there can
be little doubt that the pace of corporate mergers and acquisitions
is quickening. The number of corporate mergers and large acquisi-
tions has increased each year since 1975, and the number of signifi-
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tance of Emmanuel Edem. The author was a staff attorney in the Antitrust Division of the
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1. See generally OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1
MERGERS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP AND SUPPLEMENTARY PA-
PERS (1980) [hereinafter cited as MERGERS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY]. Although opinion is
divided, one highly regarded authority concludes that "[T]he long-run trend has clearly
been one of increasing aggregate [asset and value added] concentration." F. SCHERER, INDUS-
TRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 49 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited
as SCHERER]. Relying on Federal Trade Commission data, Professor Scherer found that the
100 largest U.S. manufacturing corporations held 47% of domestic manufacturing assets in
1973, compared with 37 % in 1947. Concentration in terms of value added by the 100 largest
manufacturing concerns, though at a lower absolute level, rose even more dramatically dur-
ing the same period, from 23% in 1947 to 33% in 1973. Id. at 48-49. "In 1976, according to
FTC statistics, the 451 largest U.S. companies controlled 70% of the nation's manufacturing
assets and earned 72% of the profits. In 1960, comparable concerns controlled only about
half the manufacturing assets and earned only 59% of the profits .. " Taylor & Schorr,
Government May Abandon Fight to Stem Conglomerate Takeovers, Wall St. J., Nov. 24,
1980, at 33, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Taylor & Schorr]. The significance of these statistics
may be mitigated by the substantial turnover over time in the identity of the 100 largest
manufacturing concerns and the relatively small percentage of national income (26%) at-
tributable to the manufacturing sector of the economy. See Weston, Industrial Concentra-
tion, Mergers, and Growth: A Summary, in MERGERS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY, supra this
note, at 38, 42-43 (1980). See also White, The Merger Wave: Is it a Problem?, Wall St. J.,
Dec. 11, 1981, at 28, col. 3 (Southwest ed.) [hereinafter cited as White].
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cantly large acquisitions has been increasing as well.' Between
1978 and 1980, there were at least 34 corporate acquisitions involv-
ing more than one-half billion dollars,3 and it is now almost com-
monplace to read about multi-billion dollar transactions.4 The cur-
rent merger wave predominantly involves conglomerate
transactions.5 Between seventy and eighty percent of recent acqui-
2. BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FTC, STATISTICAL REPORT ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
1978 25, 119 (1980) [hereinafter cited as FTC 1978 REPORT]. There were 2,395 merger an-
nouncements in 1981. The total value of these transactions was a record $82.6 billion, almost
double the previous record (set only in 1980) of $44.3 billion. Mergers Climbed 27%, Prices
Rose Nearly 20% in 1981, Surveys Find, Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 1982, at 16, col. 3 (southwest
ed.).
3. Taylor & Schorr, supra note 1.
4. Recent proposed transactions (some of which have not been consummated) include
the following:
Acquiring Firm Acquired Firm Purchase Price
DuPont Co. Conoco, Inc. $ 7.5 billion"
Societe National Elf
Aquitaine Texas Gulf Inc. $ 2.7 billionb
Standard Oil Co. of Ohio Kennecott Corp. $1.77. billionc
Fluor Corp. St. Joe Minerals Corp. $ 2.5 billiond
Nabisco Inc. Standard Brands Inc. $ 1.9 billione
Exxon Corp. Reliance Electric Co. $ 1.2 billion
f
Standard Oil Co. of
California Amax, Inc. $ 3.9 billiong
Santa Fe Industries Southern Pacific $ 1.2 billionh
Shell Oil Co. Belridge Oil Co. $ 3.7 billion
i
U.S. Steel Corp. Marathon Oil Co. $ 6.4 billionj
Connecticut General
Corp. INA Corp. $ 4.3 billion
k
' Wall St. J., July 15, 1981, at 3, col. 1. (A competing bid of $8.19 billion was made for
Conoco by Mobil Corp., Wall St. J., July 27, 1981, at 3, col. 1.)
b Wall St. J., July 7, 1981, at 2, col. 2.
C Wall St. J., June 3, 1981, at 2, col. 2.
d Wall St. J., May 13, 1981, at 2, col. 1.
'Wall St. J., April 23, 1981, at 3, col. 1. (The dollar figure represents the combined market
value of the common stock of the two merging concerns.)
f Wall St. J., March 23, 1981, at 14, col. 2. (The transaction was consummated in 1979.)
g Wall St. J., March 6, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
h Wall St. J., May 16, 1980, at 3, col. 1.
i NEWSWEEK, June 27, 1981, at 54.
j Wall St. J., Nov. 20, 1981, at 3, col. 1. (southwest ed.).
k Wall St. J., Nov. 10, 1981, at 3, col. 1. (southwest ed.). (The dollar figure represents the
combined market value of the common stock of the two merging companies.)
5. Conglomerate mergers are those which are neither horizontal (between presently com-
"Entrenchment" Under Section 7
sitions are classifiable as conglomerate, and the majority of these
mergers are classifiable as "pure" conglomerate.'
The recent acceleration of conglomerate merger activity has gen-
erated serious questions regarding the adequacy of existing law to
protect the public interests affected by such a trend.7 The thesis of
this article is that these interests may be reconciled fruitfully if the
enforcement agencies and federal courts give renewed attention to
the "entrenchment" theory, a theory tentatively explored in the
mid-1960's as a means of appraising the anticompetitive effects of
certain conglomerate mergers. The article traces the development
of the entrenchment doctrine, explores its present boundaries, and
examines the appropriateness of its broader application in the cur-
rent economic climate.
THE NEED TO EXAMINE THE ENTRENCHMENT DOCTRINE
Federal merger control policy is embodied in section 7 of the
Clayton Act.' It is generally accepted that the passage of the origi-
peting firms), nor vertical (between firms that maintain or might establish a supplier-cus-
tomer relationship).
6. FTC 1978 REPORT, supra note 2, at 115. The Federal Trade Commission classifies
conglomerate mergers into three subcategories. A "product extension" merger is one be-
tween two companies which "are functionally related in production and/or distribution
but [which] sell products that do not compete directly with one another." A "market ex-
tension" merger is one between two companies which "manufacture the same products,
but [which] sell them in different geographic markets." The third category, denominated
by the FTC as "other," and frequently referred to as "pure" conglomerate merger, involves
combinations of "essentially unrelated firms." Id. at 108-09.
7. See generally HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, CONGLOMERATE MERGERS-THEIR
EFFECTS ON SMALL BUSINESS AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES, H.R. REP. No. 96-1447, H. Doc. No.
96-343, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 96-1447]; Proposed
Small and Independent Business Protection Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 600 Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly and Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, pts. 1 & 2, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1979); Rodino, Fearing Effects of
Large Mergers, Plans House Hearings on Antitrust Policy, Wall St. J., July 23, 1981, at
13, col. 1.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976), as amended by the Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 1157 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1976) (amended 1980)] provides in pertinent part:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall ac-
quire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or
in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a
monopoly.
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nal Clayton Acts in 1914 was in large part a reaction to the Su-
preme Court's opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. United States0 and
its enunciation of the "rule of reason"11 as the guiding principle for
construing the vaguely worded Sherman Act.12 The Sixty-third
Congress feared that the rule of reason would be employed to ex-
onerate types of business practices which it had presumed the
Sherman Act to condemn. 3 To prevent this development, Con-
gress identified in the Clayton Act several specific acts or prac-
tices" which could be enjoined whenever their effect might 5 be "to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly."' 6
One of the specific categories of conduct to be subjected to this
"effects" clause was set out in section 7:17 the acquisition of one
9. Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). See note 17 infra for the text of the original
version of § 7.
10. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
11. The term "rule of reason" was coined by Chief Justice White in his opinion for the
Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, id. The term refers to the judicial gloss placed
on the categorical language of the Sherman Act, which condemns "every contract, combina-
tion . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade," 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) (emphasis added), and
"every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire...
to monopolize any part of the trade on commerce," 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) (emphasis added).
The Court interpreted the term "every" in sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act to reach
only "unreasonable" practices. 221 U.S. at 65-69.
12. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)).
13. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 303a & 303b, at 4-5 (1978) [herein-
after cited as AREEDA & TURNER]. Although most of the legislative support for passage of
the Clayton Act reflected a desire "to strengthen and clarify the law which many believed
[Chief Justice] White had emasculated and obscured," Chadwell, Competition Under Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act-Instant Antitrust or Long-Run Policy, 27 A.B.A. ANTITRUST
SECTION 60, 61 (1965), some may have supported the legislation in the hopes of preventing
too aggressive an application of the rule of reason to business conduct. See P. AREEDA, ANTI-
TRUST ANALYSIS 148, at 52 (3d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as AREEDA]. However, the formal
title of the bill that became the Clayton Act, "An Act to supplement existing laws against
unlawful restraints and monopolices .... " suggests that Congress' objective indeed was to
strengthen federal antitrust policy to reach transactions which the courts might have found
"reasonable" under Standard Oil's rule of reason.
14. The Clayton Act deals with price discrimination (§ 2), tying and exclusive dealing (§
3), merger (§ 7), and interlocking directorates (§ 8). 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 18 & 19 (1976)
(amended 1980).
15. Each substantive provision of the Clayton Act would be violated when challenged
conduct "may" have one of the proscribed effects of substantially lessening competition or
tending to create a monopoly. Id. § 18 (emphasis added). The administration of the statute
thus requires predictions of consequences likely to flow from challenged conduct, rather
than findings that adverse consequences have already occurred.
16. Id.
17. The original § 7 provided:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation en-
gaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to substan-
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company by a competitor of that company.18 The inclusion of such
acquisitions on the list of suspect business conduct indicates that
Congress was not content to allow merger law to develop within
the unknown and presumptively tolerant contours of the rule of
reason. Although pre-Standard Oil merger cases decided under the
Sherman Act had revealed no inclination toward leniency on the
part of the Supreme Court,19 the rule of reason seemed to portend
a construction of the Sherman Act's broad language which might
countenance a combination of two previously competing firms so
long as their merger did not create power to control prices, i.e.,
monopoly power.2 0 Section 7 assured that at least horizontal merg-
ers21 would be held to a stricter standard than that, with any likely
substantial lessening of competition between the merging firms be-
ing sufficient to warrant enjoining the transaction."
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was significantly amended in 1950
by passage of the Celler-Kefauver Act.3 Like the original Clayton
Act itself, the 1950 legislation was stimulated by a Supreme Court
decision. In United States v. Columbia Steel Co.," the Court had
approved United States Steel Company's acquisition of a western
steel fabricating concern in a transaction which had serious hori-
zontal, vertical, and market extension competitive implications."
tially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and
the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any sec-
tion or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce.
Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731-32 (1914).
18. The original § 7 solely addressed the lessening of competition between the acquiring
and acquired firms. Its scope was thus primarily limited to horizontal mergers, although a
non-horizontal merger could be reached under the "tend to create a monopoly of any line of
commerce" proscription. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S.
586 (1957).
19. See, e.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
20. Chief Justice White's explication of the rule of reason in Standard Oil tended to
view "the wrong against which the statute provided," to be "the consequence of monopoly."
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55, 60 (1911).
21. See note 18 supra.
22. See note 15 supra.
23. Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950). The 1980 amendments, supra
note 8, extended the reach of the Act to entities other than corporations and to those en-
gaged "in any activity affecting commerce." See note 8 supra for the text of the current
version of § 7.
24. 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
25. The Court thus approved entry through merger of the nation's largest steel
company into a developing geographic market by absorption of a major firm. It
approved an increase in the level of concentration in an already highly concen-
trated industry, as well as the end of significant actual and potential competition.
L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 591 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Loyola University Law Journal
This acquisition could not be reached under the Clayton Act be-
cause of the "asset loophole" incorporated in the original section 7.
Befor6 the adoption of the 1950 amendments, section 7 condemned
only stock acquisitions, 6 and United States Steel had acquired the
assets of Consolidated Steel, not its stock.2 7 The Federal Trade
Commission had long sought to have Congress plug this "asset
loophole,"2 and the Columbia Steel decision provided the impetus
to accomplish that end.2 9 But there was more to the 1950 amend-
ments than this. Subtle changes in the language of section 7 and a
fairly compelling legislative history reveal that years of persistent
lobbying by the Federal Trade Commission had coalesced with in-
creasing concern over a perceived post-war rush to economic con-
centration to produce not only a major broadening of the jurisdic-
tional reach of section 7, but a broadening of federal merger policy
objectives as well. In an exhaustive and authoritative"0 review of
the legislative history of the 1950 amendments, the Supreme Court
in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States"1 described the overriding pol-
icy concerns which the new legislation reflected as follows:
The dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of
the 1950 amendments was a fear of what was considered to be a
rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy.
Apprehension in this regard was bolstered by the publication in
1948 of the Federal Trade Commission's study on corporate
mergers. Statistics from this and other current studies were cited
as evidence of the danger to the American economy in unchecked
corporate expansion through mergers. Other considerations cited
in support of the bill were the desirability of retaining "local con-
trol" over industry and the protection of small businesses.
Throughout the recorded discussion may be found examples of
Congress' fear not only of accelerated concentration of economic
power on economic grounds, but also of the threat to other values
SULLIVAN].
26. See note 17 supra.
27. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 498 (1948).
28. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 314 & n.25 (1962).
29. See id. at 318 n.33. "[T]here is no doubt that Congress did wish to 'plug the loop-
hole' and to include within the coverage of the [Clayton] Act the acquisition of assets no less
than the acquisition of stock." Id. at 316. See also SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at 592.
30. Leading scholars generally stipulate the accuracy of Brown Shoe's construction of
the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Act. See 4 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, 1
903, at 8-11; R. PosNaR & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 153 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited
as POSNER & EASTERBROOK]; SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at 592 n.2. But see 4 AREEDA & TUR-
NER, supra note 13, V 904, at 11-14.
31. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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a trend toward concentration was thought to pose.s"
While the amendments retained an "effects" clause which re-
quires a showing of a probable substantial lessening of competition
or a tendency to create a monopoly before an acquisition might be
enjoined,33 the Supreme Court was impressed with Congress' over-
riding emphasis on economic concentration and its concomitant so-
cial, political, and economic consequences. The legislative history
led the Court to perceive a mandate for a more sophisticated and
sensitive analysis of the likely effects of a given merger.3' In partic-
ular, the Court discerned a directive to consider the relationship
between concentration and competition when evaluating the prob-
able effects of a merger.38 Both the existence and the substantial-
ity of any probable lessening of competition were to be analyzed in
the context of this concentration/competition relationship. The
Court construed this Congressional mandate to authorize the es-
tablishment of a presumption that a merger which portends to ini-
tiate or exacerbate a trend toward concentration in an industry
also portends a lessening of competition in that industry.", A
probable lessening of competition was capable of being character-
ized as "substantial" if the threatened increase in concentra-
tion-in the context of any clearly identified market-was consid-
ered "substantial."3 7
Another significant effect of the 1950 amendments was the re-
moval of the provision in original section 7 which had restricted
the scope of inquiry to the elimination of any competition which
may have existed between the acquiring and acquired firms.3 ' Al-
though the effects of a given merger were to be examined in the
context of a specific market 9 and its "structure, history .and proba-
32. Id. at 315-16.
33. See note 8 supra.
34. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22 & 322 n.38 (1962).
35. Id. at 317-18 & 318 n.32.
36. Id. at 333-34, 344-46.
37. As the Supreme Court stated in its first post-Brown Shoe merger decision:
[W]e think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage
share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentra-
tion of firms in that market, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substan-
tially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the
merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
38. See notes 17 & 18 supra.
39. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1962).
19821
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ble future, 4 ° the courts were now free to search far and wide to
find any line of commerce and any section of the country in which
substantial adverse concentration/competition effects would be
likely. The more sophisticated analysis mandated by amended sec-
tion 7 was, therefore, capable of being applied to vertical and con-
glomerate mergers, as well as horizontal ones.41
During the 10 years following the Brown Shoe decision, the Su-
preme Court, adhering to the mandate it had perceived in the 1950
amendments, proceeded to fashion a set of legal rules which have
been described as being "so strict that relatively few horizontal or
vertical mergers are now attempted. 4 2 The emergence of these
rules tended to direct corporate acquisition propensities toward
conglomerate merger.43 Although there are three distinct types of
conglomerate mergers"-product extension, market extension, and
pure conglomerate-a series of Supreme Court opinions in the im-
mediate post-Brown Shoe period indicated that amended section 7
would be flexible enough to deal with all three. Speaking in terms
of such relatively esoteric concepts as potential competition, 3 en-
trenchment i4 and reciprocity,47 the Court explained how each type
of conglomerate acquisition might aggravate the concentration/
competition relationship in a given market to such an extent that
section 7's "effects" clause would be violated. Despite this string of
government enforcement victories, the late 1960's witnessed an un-
precedented merger boom in which conglomerate mergers
40. Id. at 322 n.38.
41. Id. at 317 & n.31.
42. Baker & Grimm, S.600-An Unnecessary and Dangerous Foray into Classic Popu-
lism, 40 OHIo ST. L.J. 847, 854 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Baker & Grimm]. See also STAFF
or ANTITRUST SUBCOMM. OF HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 92D CONG., 1ST SESS., INVESTIGATION
OF CONGLOMERATE CORPORATIONS 2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as House Staff Report]. Al-
though the observation by Baker and Grimm is undoubtedly accurate, see FTC 1978 RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 115, the current merger wave, see notes 2-4 supra and accompanying
text, encompasses a number of striking horizontal and vertical proposals. See, e.g.,.Conoco
Merger With Mobil or Texaco May Pass (.S. Antitrust Scrutiny but Spark Private Suits,
Wall St. J., July 15, 1981, at 4, col. 1; Gulf Oil Raising $5 Billion Credit to Buy Oil Firm,
Wall St. J., July 21, 1981, at 3, col. 1; Heileman Makes $494 Million Bid for Jos. Schlitz,
Wall St. J., July 27, 1981, at 2, col. 2; Mobil Begins Two-Step Offer for Marathon Oil Stock,
But Target Concern Appears Ready to Fight Bid, Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 1981, at 3, col. 1
(southwest ed.).
43. See HOUSE STAFF REPORT, supra note 42, at 2. See also SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at
598.
44. See note 6 supra.
45. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
46. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
47. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
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predominated. 8
In the late 1960's and the early 1970's, the conglomerate merger
movement became a political issue. The Democratic Congress,
alarmed at the accelerating trend toward concentration in the
economy, explored the need for new legislation to strengthen sec-
tion 7 still further."9 Meanwhile, the Republican administration
promised to vigorously contest the conglomerate merger trend
under existing law.60 In 1970, Richard McLaren, the Assistant At-
torney General in charge of the Justice Department's Antitrust Di-
vision, advised a Senate subcommittee that additional merger leg-
islation seemed unnecessary in light of the Supreme Court's
receptivity to the economic theories of potential competition, en-
trenchment, and reciprocity.0 1 He pointed out that the Justice De-
partment had recently commenced additional litigation which was
expected to test, and perhaps expand, the reach of these theories.52
He added, however, this note of caution: "If we are incorrect [in
our assessment of the pending cases], then the need for new legis-
lation, of somesort, is clear." 58 Unfortunately, the validity of Mr.
McLaren's assessment of the ability of section 7 to stem the con-
glomerate merger tide eluded an authoritative test. The cases
which the Justice Department had selected to be the vehicles by
which the law could be clarified were settled.k
48. SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at 653.
49. See generally HousE STAFF REPORT, supra note 42. Congressional alarm was stimu-
lated when Donald Turner, then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice, took the position in 1967 that § 7 was inadequate to deal
with conglomerate mergers. SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at 654. Professor Turner's position on
this issue had been foreshadowed in his article, Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section
7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HAzv. L. REv. 1313 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Turner].
50. Address by John Mitchell, Attorney General, Georgia Bar Association, Savannah,
Georgia (June 6, 1969), reprinted in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 50,107, at 55,124 (1981).
51. Statement by Assistant Attorney General Richard McLaren, Subcommittee on Anti-
trust and Monopoly, Senate Committee on the Judiciary (February 18, 1970), reprinted in 5
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 50,114, at 55,172 (1981) [hereinafter cited as McLaren
Statement].
52. Id. at 55,175. The cases were United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., et al., Civ.
Action No. 69-438, W.D. Pa.; United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., Civ. Action
No. 69-C-924, N.D. Ill.; United States v. Northwest Ind., Inc., et al., Civ. Action No. 69-C-
1102, N.D. Ill.; United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., et al., Civ. Action No.
13320, D. Conn.; United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., et al., Civ. Action No.
13319, D. Conn.
53. McLaren Statement, supra note 51, at 55,177.
54. United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 1971 Trade Cas. 11 73,665-66 (D.
Conn. 1971) (consent judgments entered); United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.,
1971 Trade Cas. 7 73,619 (N.D. III. 1971) (consent judgment entered). For a review of the
circumstances surrounding the settlement of these suits, see Blake, Beyond the ITT Case,
1982]
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The Supreme Court continued to acknowledge the applicability
of section 7 to conglomerate mergers in the early 1970's,55 but the
Court's decisions in this period began to reveal significant dis-
agreements among the Justices." Out of these disagreements
emerged a "new antitrust majority" 57 which succeeded in reducing
the potential competition theory, "once the most promising of the
conglomerate merger theories, . . . into a doctrine of almost meta-
physical complexity."' "5 The result has been that in the seven years
since the emergence of this "new antitrust majority," government
and private plaintiffs have lost twenty consecutive conglomerate
merger cases which were based on the potential competition the-
ory.59 Moreover, the applicability of section 7 to pure conglomerate
mergers remains uncertain. °
The Supreme Court's change of attitude with regard to the po-
tential competition theory was not prompted by legislative direc-
tion. In fact, Congress had acquiesced in the Court's rather bold
HARPER'S, June, 1972, at 74.
55. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); Ford Motor Co. v.
United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972). The government prevailed in each case.
56. Four separate opinions were filed in each of the cases cited in note 55 supra, al-
though only seven Justices participated in each decision.
57. This emergence occurred in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S.
602 (1974). Marine Bancorporation was the first conglomerate merger opinion rendered by
the Court in which all four of President Nixon's appointees participated. Justices Powell
and Rehnquist had not participated in Ford, and Justice Powell had not participated in
Falstaff. In Marine Bancorporation, Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined the other two
Nixon appointees, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, and, together with holdover
Justice Stewart, formed the five-member majority. Justice White's dissenting opinion in
Marine Bancorporation referred to this group as "the Court's new antitrust majority." 418
U.S. at 642.
58. Brodley, Limiting Conglomerate Mergers: The Need for Legislation, 40 OHIo ST.
L.J. 867, 869 n.8 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BRODLEY, Limiting Conglomerate Mergers].
59. Taylor & Schorr, supra note 1. See also Brodley, Limiting Conglomerate Mergers,
supra note 58, at 868-69 & nn.5 & 8. But see Grand Union Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1
21,888, at 22,235 (FTC 1981) (decision of FTC Administrative Law Judge holding supermar-
ket chain merger illegal on potential competition grounds); Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. v. FTC,
1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,202 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3802 (U.S. Apr.
5, 1982) (affirming FTC order enjoining an international joint venture on potential competi-
tion grounds).
The significance of the "new antitrust majority's" retreat from earlier Supreme Court pro-
nouncements on the potential competition doctrine is reviewed in Brodley, Potential Com-
petition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE L.J. 1, 16-19 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers]. See also Sloviter, The October 1973 Term
Merger Cases: Whither Clayton § 7?, 48 TEMPLE L.Q. 861, 903-10 (1975).
60. Ford, Falstaff, and Marine Bancorporation all involved product or market extension
mergers. Their impact on the entrenchment theory and the problem of pure conglomerate
transactions is discussed in notes 141-156 infra and accompanying text.
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development of the potential competition theory in the 1960's."
Therefore, it is not suprising that, as had been the case following
Standard Oil62 and Columbia Steel,"3 the more timid decisions of
the early 1970's provoked Congress to consider legislation re-em-
phasizing the anti-concentration policy that had prompted passage
of the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950.64 At this time, however, no new
legislation has been forthcoming, nor are prospects for it
favorable.6 5
Much recent discussion has focused on the likelihood that the
potential competition theory, once so promising, might be revived
in an appropriate case," making section 7 once again a potent
61. The Supreme Court had expressed its enthusiasm for the potential competition doc-
trine in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Continental
Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964);
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). Despite this string of govern-
ment victories based at least in part on potential competition grounds, there was no Con-
gressional action regarding § 7 prior to the Marine Bancorporation decision in 1974.
62. See text accompanying notes 9-22 supra.
63. See text accompanying notes 23-29 supra.
64. See S. 600, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). This bill would create a rebuttable presump-
tion against mergers between two very large firms or between one very large firm and a
leading firm in a concentrated industry. It resembles the 1968 proposal of the Presidential
task force. See REPORT OF WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST POLICY ("NEAL RE-
PORT") 3 (1968), reprinted in 2 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. [hereinafter cited as NEAL
REPORT].
65. See Taylor & Schorr, supra note 1. Efforts to pass S. 600, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979), made little progress prior to the election of President Reagan and the 97th Congress.
Both Mr. Reagan and the Republican majority now in control of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee are on record as opposing anticonglomerate bills. Id. See also Reagan Team Believes
Antitrust Legislation Hurts Big Business, Wall St. J., July 8, 1981, at 1, col. 1. But see
Mobil's Conoco Bid Sparks Moves by Justice Agency and Legislators, Wall St. J., July 20,
1981, at 3, col. 1 (efforts at reviving S. 600-type bills being contemplated in the House and
Senate).
The fact that the recent change in the philosophy of § 7's interpretation has been man-
dated judicially rather than legislatively confounds the debate over the need for new legisla-
tion. Compare, e.g., Baker & Grimm, supra note 42, with Brodley, Limiting Conglomerate
Mergers, supra note 58. Although it is true that Congress has been unwilling to pass post-
Marine Bancorporation proposed legislation, it is surely as significant to note that Congress
consciously acquiesced in the anti-conglomerate opinions of the 1960's. See note 61 supra
and accompanying text. Indeed, whatever action Congress has taken with respect to § 7
since the 1950 amendments has been to ease its enforcement or expand its coverage. See
Clayton Act, § 7A, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (added by Pub. L. 94-435, Title II, § 201, 90 Stat. 1390
(1976)) (premerger notification required and "hold separate" orders available for large ac-
quisitions); Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 6(a), 94
Stat. 1157 (1980) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)) (enlarging the jurisdiction of § 7 to reach
business entities affecting interstate commerce as well as those engaged in interstate
commerce).
66. See Baker & Grimm, supra note 42, at 854-55; Brodley, Potential Competition
Mergers, supra note 59, at 63-89.
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force for combating large conglomerate mergers. Yet, the Govern-
ment continues to search for the "perfect" potential competition
case to take to the Supreme Court to revive that theory." This has
led some commentators to conclude that section 7's demise in the
conglomerate field is complete." They advocate the need for en-
forcement and legislative initiatives which would allow the courts
to bypass section 7's "effects" clause and its requirement that
there be a showing of a probable lessening of competition or a ten-
dency to create a monopoly before a merger can be enjoined.9
Before the "effects" clause is abandoned or modified, however, it is
appropriate to re-examine some of the other theories which were
endorsed by the Supreme Court in the 1960's, in order to deter-
mine whether a less drastic means exists to re-establish the vitality
of section 7 in the conglomerate area.
One of the promising section 7 theories of the mid-1960's was
"entrenchment."' 0 Like potential competition, the entrenchment
theory has been viewed skeptically of late. Some authorities have
dismissed it as unimportant, suggesting that it is too narrow to
reach most of the recent large transactions. 1 Others fear an over-
broad application of the entrenchment doctrine which would es-
tablish a rule of virtual per se illegality for any large conglomerate
merger which promises to make the acquired firm more efficient.
7
'
It is true that a theory incapable of distinguishing between those
transactions that threaten to lessen competition in a relevant mar-
ket and those that do not would be of little utility given the cur-
67. "'As the losses pile up,' said Barry Grossman, Chief of the Antitrust Division's Ap-
pellate Section, 'it becomes more important to choose your (case) carefully.'" Justice De-
partment Won't Appeal Loss on Merger Theory, Wall St. J., December 3, 1980, at 18, col. 4.
68. See, e.g., Brodley, Limiting Conglomerate Mergers, supra note 58, at 869: "[T]here
is virtually no prospect that the present Court will adopt effective rules to regulate conglom-
erate mergers."
69. . Id. at 890-92; Carstensen & Questal, The Use of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act to Attack Large Conglomerate Mergers, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 841 (1978).
See also H.R. REP. No. 96-1447, supra note 7; Statement of the Federal Trade Commission
Regarding Staff Recommendations of Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Potential
Competition Mergers, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 50,419, at 55,942 (1980).
70. The entrenchment theory focuses on the propensity for a given merger to insulate an
existing market leader, or an existing noncompetitive market structure, from competitive
forces. The details of entrenchment analysis are developed in the text accompanying notes
157-95 infra.
71. See Brodley, Limiting Conglomerate Mergers, supra note 58, at 869 & n.8. See also
Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and Section Seven: The Limitations of the Anti-
Merger Act, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1255-64 (1968).
72. 5 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13,$ 1103, at 5-11; POSNER & EASTERBROOK, supra
note 30, at 511-12.
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rent language of section 7.73 The Supreme Court has yet to deter-
mine, however, whether the entrenchment theory incorporates
such a fatal flaw."' This article examines the entrenchment doc-
trine to see if it might be revived as a coherent, economically de-
fensible theory under which a significant number or class of con-
glomerate mergers might be shown to violate the "effects" clause of
the Clayton Act's existing section 7.
THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENTRENCHMENT
DOCTRINE IN CONGLOMERATE MERGER CASES
Origins
The entrenchment doctrine is generally considered to have been
first announced in FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,75 decided by the
Supreme Court in 1967. In 1957, Procter had acquired Clorox
Chemical Co., which was by far the leading manufacturer and mar-
keter of household liquid bleach in the United States, with a mar-
ket share approaching 50% nationally. 76 Largely as a consequence
of Clorox's dominance, the industry was highly concentrated, with
the six leading firms accounting for almost 80 % of the market.77 At
the time of the acquisition, Procter neither manufactured nor sold
liquid bleach; it was, however, the country's leading marketer of
household detergent and the nation's largest advertiser. Since the
marketing of liquid bleach depended heavily on mass advertising,
the Cloiox product fit neatly into Procter's product line.7 8 In short,
this was the paradigm product extension merger.7 9 The FTC
promptly" attacked the acquisition on the basis of two apparently
distinct81 theories. One ground of the attack was based on the po-
73. See note 28 supra.
74. See notes 141-56 infra and accompanying text.
75. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
76. Id. at 570-71.
77. Id. at 571.
78. Id. at 572-74.
79. Id. at 577-78. For the FTC's definition of product extension mergers, see note 6
supra.
80. The acquisition was closed on August 1, 1957, and the FTC's complaint was issued
on September 30, 1957. Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465, 1469 (1963).
81. Although the Supreme Court treated the FTC's opinion as if it had found two inde-
pendent grounds for holding the merger to be in violation of § 7, 386 U.S. at 574-75, 578,
one of those grounds, the elimination of potential competition, was not articulated carefully
in the FTC's formal complaint. The factual allegations of the complaint did not contend
that but for the acquisition Procter would have entered the bleach industry independently
("future potential competition" theory). Nor did the complaint allege that Procter had been
exerting a pro-competitive influence on the bleach industry prior to its acquisition of Clorox
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tential competition theory.82 The FTC noted that because Procter
was the most likely entrant into the liquid bleach industry, the ac-
quisition deprived bleach consumers of the competitive influence
which Procter had been exerting from the wings of the bleach in-
dustry."' In advancing the theory that has come to be known as the
entrenchment theory, the FTC contended that, as a result of the
acquisition, "[respondent's competitive position in the production
and sale of household liquid bleaches may be enhanced to the det-
riment of actual and potential competition." 4
In support of the "enhancement" allegation, the FTC found
Procter to be in a position to bestow upon Clorox significant com-
petitive advantages which would alter the structural characteristics
of the liquid bleach industry.85 These advantages included access
to volume discounts on advertising (which was all-important in
this industry),"' an existing direct sales force, 7 promotional and
display preferences at the retail level (attributable to Procter's po-
sition as an important supplier "of a broad range of common gro-
cery items"),88 and the "financial strength" of a larger, diversified
parent company, which would be available to discipline, by price-
cutting or excessive promotion, any existing or potential rival con-
("actual potential competition" theory, or "wings effect"). See generally AREEDA, supra note
13, T 603, at 845-47. The complaint did include a broad allegation that "[a]ctualoand poten-
tial competition generally in the production and sale of household liquid bleaches may be
substantially lessened." Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465, 1472 (1963). But actually,
the loss of the pro-competitive influence being exerted by Procter prior to the acquisition
was viewed by the FTC primarily as a factor which aggravated, i.e., made more substantial,
the entrenchment effects of the merger. The Commission appears not to have treated the
loss of potential competition as an independent ground for decision. See id. at 1560, 1569-
82. Thus, the Supreme Court seems to have treated the two theories as more obviously
distinct than did the FTC. But see note 116 infra and accompanying text.
82. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 574-75, 578 (1967). See note 81 supra.
83. Id. at 575; Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465, 1577-78 (1963). The Supreme
Court obliquely suggested that the FTC had also rested its decision on the "future potential
competition" (see note 81 supra) theory. 386 U.S. at 575. In fact, the Commission's reliance
on potential competition concerns was restricted to the "actual potential competition" or
"wings effect" (see note 81 supra) theory. Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465, 1578
(1963). The Supreme Court's fuller treatment of the potential competition aspects of the
case is confined to this "actual potential competition" theory. 386 U.S. at 580-81.
84. Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465, 1473 (1963) (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 1568.
86. Id. at 1562-65. On the merits of this point see Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
419 F. Supp. 931, 936 (C.D. Cal. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 596 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1979);
Peterman, The Clorox Case and the Television Rate Structures, 12 J. LAW & ECON. 321
(1968).
87. Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465, 1565 (1963).
88. Id. at 1566.
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templating aggressive price competition or promotion.89 These ad-
vantages previously had been unavailable to the Clorox Com-
pany.90 Now that the market leader had access to these
advantages, the FTC predicted that existing competitors and po-
tential entrants would become incrementally intimidated, thus
substantially lessening the level of competition in the industry.9 "
The Supreme Court accepted both of the FTC's theories, poten-
tial competition and entrenchment. 92  Specifically, the Court
thought it was probable that (1) the oligopolistic structure of the
liquid bleach industry would become even more rigid than it had
been, as existing competitors, intimidated by the incremental
power wielded by Procter, as compared with Clorox, would likely
fall in line under the price leadership of Procter, 3 and (2) the pos-
sibilities for eventual deconcentration of the industry through the
attraction of new entrants would be significantly reduced because
of the heightened barriers to entry attributable to the advertising,
marketing, and promotional prowess of Procter." The Court, like
89. Id. at 1566-67.
90. Id. at 1563-67.
91. The Commission summarized the argument as follows:
Procter. . . is in a position to entrench still further the already settled consumer
preference for the Clorox brand, and thereby make new entry even more forbid-
ding than it was prior to the merger.
[A] heightening of entry barriers concomitantly enhances the power of mar-
ket leaders to dominate their small rivals, and so smother effective competition.
Given Procter's materially greater strength, compared to Clorox, as a liquid bleach
competitor, vigorous competition by the small firms in the industry would appear
still more effectively and substantially inhibited than prior to the merger.
Id. at 1568. These conclusions were based essentially on predictions of how competitive
relationships in the industry would develop after the merger. Although the Hearing Exam-
iner had supported some of his findings with post-acquisition evidence, which seemed to
corroborate these predictions, the Commission eschewed any reliance on this evidence. Id. at
1582-84.
92. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 574-75, 578 (1967). See note 81 supra.
Although the word "entrenched" does not appear until the last page of the Supreme Court's
opinion, the Court firmly embraced the Commission's predictions which had supported its
entrenchment theory. In listing the "anticompetitive effects with which this product-exten-
sion merger is fraught," the Court stated that "the substitution of the powerful acquiring
firm for the smaller, but already dominant, firm may substantially reduce the competitive
structure of the industry by raising entry barriers and by dissuading the smaller firms from
aggressively competing." Id. at 578.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 579. The Court, like the FTC, was willing to condemn the acquisition on the
basis of assumptions and predictions. Although the Court was less reluctant than the FTC
to bolster the validity of these predictions by references to post-acquisition evidence, see id.
at 579 n.3, its affirmance of the FTC's assessment of the probable competitive effects cannot
be said to have relied on such evidence. "[T]here is certainly no requirement that the an-
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the Commission, considered it significant that there was a "very
great discrepancy in size between Procter and, not only Clorox, but
any firm in the liquid bleach industry."'95 The Court seems almost
implicitly to have concluded that these effects were likely enough
and substantial enough to bring the acquisition within the prohibi-
tions of section 7's "effects" clause.9 6
It must be emphasized that the predicted structural effects
which the Supreme Court identified in Procter & Gamble were rel-
evant only to that part of section 7's "effects" clause which focuses
on the tendency "to substantially lessen competition." The court
did not deem it necessary to conclude that the acquisition would
"tend to create a monopoly" in order to find a section 7 violation.
It was sufficient for the Court that the level of competition gener-
ally within the industry was likely to be adversely affected due to
the fortification of the already leading firm. The FTC also had
been concerned primarily with the first of the two types of effects
prohibited by section 7.97 For both the FTC and the Supreme
Court, then, Procter's ability to "entrench" the Clorox brand was
condemned not because this would tend to create a monopoly, but
rather, because it would tend substantially to lessen competition
generally throughout the liquid bleach industry. It was the non-
competitive market structure which was being entrenched as much
as the position of the acquired firm. Therefore, although the en-
trenchment doctrine implicates, at least potentially,"8 both aspects
of section 7's "effects" clause-the tendency to create a monopoly
ticompetitive power manifest itself in anticompetitive action before section 7 can be called
into play." Id. at 577. See generally Note, The Effective Use of Postacquisition Evidence
Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 12 Loy. Chi. L.J. 459 (1981).
95. The quoted language is from the FTC's opinion, Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C.
1465, 1571 (1963). See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,.386 U.S. 568, 578-79 (1967) (referring
to size disparity in adopting both potential competition and entrenchment theories).
96. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1967). Whether the Court intended
to hold that these structural entrenchment effects would have been sufficient to make out a
§ 7 violation in the absence of the perceived potential competition effects is uncertain. See
text accompanying notes 107-33 infra.
97. Whenever the FTC emphasized the likely increased dominance of Clorox following
the merger, it was to demonstrate how competition generally would be lessened, not how
Procter would tend to become a bleach monopolist. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co., 63
F.T.C. 1465, 1568 (1963), quoted at note 91 supra.
98. The FTC observed that "a merger involving a leading firm in a market that is al-
ready well on the way to a non-competitive structure" could aggravate non-competitive con-
ditions to such an extent that "resort may be had ... to the statute's tendency-to-monop-
oly clause." Id. at 1577. Since competition in the pre-merger bleach market had not
deteriorated to such an extent, the Commission found it unncessary to invoke the "ten-
dency-to-monopoly" clause in this case. Id.
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and the tendency to substantially lessen competition in the indus-
try generally-Procter & Gamble established that a showing on ei-
ther one of these effects is sufficient to invoke the doctrine.
Although Procter & Gamble is generally considered to be the
first case to discuss the concept of entrenchment, an opinion of the
Supreme Court two years earlier had foreshadowed the theory. In
FTC v. Consolidated Foods,99 the FTC succeeded in blocking the
acquisition of a leading, but not dominant, manufacturer of dehy-
drated onions and garlic by a much larger food processor and dis-
tributor.100 Characterizing the acquisition as a product extension
merger, the FTC predicted that the acquired firm, Gentry, would
be the beneficiary of an "unfair" advantage as a result of the ac-
quisition. Since many of Gentry's customers and potential custom-
ers were dependent upon the goodwill of Consolidated for the suc-
cessful marketing of their products, it was thought that they would
tend to patronize Gentry in order to induce Consolidated to con-
tinue to make purchases from them. The FTC described this "ad-
vantage" as "a mixed threat and lure of reciprocal buying." 10 1
Thus, although the Consolidated Foods case is most frequently
cited for its stern language about reciprocity, coerced or volun-
tary,102 it can also be viewed as an application of what has become
known as the entrenchment doctrine. The buying power of the ac-
quiring company would give the acquired company an "unfair ad-
vantage" not previously enjoyed, and that advantage would tend to
insulate the acquired firm from competition which otherwise would
have occurred. 03 If the acquired firm could not be predicted to
dominate its industry as a result of this advantage, it could be pre-
dicted to garner more business than it otherwise would have, thus
deterring new entrants.'" The new advantage would aggravate an
already oligopolistic situation, and the significant position of the
acquired firm would become artifically fortified, or entrenched,
against competitive inroads.'0 5 The FTC had found the threatened
lessening of competition to be substantial, and Justice Douglas,
speaking for the Court, thought that conclusion was supported by
substantial evidence, particularly in view of Gentry's already sub-
99. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
100. Id. at 595 & n.3.
101. Id. at 593.
102. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at 656-57.
103. 380 U.S. at 597.
104. Id. at 598-99.
105. Id. at 599.
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stantial position in the market. 10 6
Sufficiency of Entrenchment Effects Alone
Although it was not the case in Consolidated Foods, most Gov-
ernment attacks on conglomerate mergers have included an argu-
ment under the potential competition theory.107 In such cases,
where more than one theory is advanced, the courts have not al-
ways carefully separated their analyses of the separate and distinct
theories. This is not entirely the fault of the courts. Often it ap-
pears that the enforcement agencies view their theories as related,
or even cumulative." 8 This raises the question whether entrench-
ment effects, standing alone, may make out a violation of section 7.
If the entrenchment doctrine is nothing more than an aggravating
factor which can tip an ambiguous potential competition case over
the edge of illegality, then the theory would be of little relevance to
pure conglomerate transactions, where, even before its demise, the
potential competition doctrine had little force. 109 On the other
hand, if entrenchment effects are sufficient in themselves to make
out a section 7 violation, then the entrenchment doctrine could ap-
ply across the board to all three types of conglomerate
transactions."10
Procter & Gamble itself implies that the entrenchment theory
can stand on its own two feet. The Court's opinion avoided the
cumulative effects approach found in Commissioner Elman's opin-
ion for the FTC."' The potential competition and entrenchment
theories were enumerated separately." 2 Also, Justice Harlan's
106. Id. at 600.
107. The various aspects of the potential competition doctrine are summarized at note
81 supra. For a detailed analysis of the potential competition doctrine, see Brodley, Poten-
tial Competition Mergers, supra note 59.
108. This was true of the FTC's approach in the Clorox case. The Commission's opinion,
authored by Commissioner Elman, suggested that it was the combination of the loss of
Procter as a potential entrant plus the entrenchment of Clorox which supported the conclu-
sion that there would be a substantial lessening of competition. Procter & Gamble Co., 63
F.T.C. 1465 (1963). See note 81 supra and note 116 infra.
109. See text accompanying notes 57-60 supra. In a pure conglomerate transaction,
where there is no obvious relationship between the activities of the acquired and acquiring
firms, it is virtually impossible to establish one of the prerequisites for invoking the poten-
tial competition doctrine: that the acquiring firm is one of only a very few firms which have
both the incentive and capability to enter the acquired firm's market. See SULUVAN, supra
note 25, at 634-35.
110. See note 6 supra.
111. See note 108 supra.
112. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1967).
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careful concurring opinion considered entrenchment to be an inde-
pendently viable theory, ' and he thought the majority had so
found.114 But the sufficiency of the theory was not addressed
squarely in Justice Douglas' opinion for the Court.
Few courts since Procter & Gamble have addressed the theory's
sufficiency directly, but the first lower court cases to apply the
Procter & Gamble holding tended to treat reasonable predictions
of entrenchment effects as a sufficient ground to support a finding
of a section 7 violation. General Foods Corp. v. FTC""6 was the
first post-Procter & Gamble case to reach the courts. At issue was
General Foods' acquisition of S.O.S. Company, a leading manufac-
turer of soaped steel wool scouring pads. The FTC's opinion men-
tioned potential competition only to describe how that competition
would be adversely affected by the predicted entrenchment ef-
fects.11 6 The Third Circuit similarly treated the loss of potential
competition merely as a consequence of the merger's entrenchment
effects, not as an independent ground for decision. 17 The court
113. See id. at 598-99 (Harlan, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 585-86 (Harlan, J., concurring).
115. 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968).
116. The Commission viewed the case as on all fours with Procter & Gamble. General
Foods Corp., 69 F.T.C. 380, 418, 421-22 (1966). It found that "General Foods' entry into the
household steel wool market conferred on S.O.S. a series of advantages which its competi-
tors could not match." Id. at 424. Although the Commission went on to conclude that this
transfer of advantages from General Foods to S.O.S. would "have the effect of substantially
lessening potential competition," it was not thereby advancing the potential competition
doctrine as a ground for condemning the merger. Id. at 426. The FTC did not contend that
the merger foreclosed "future potential competition" between General Foods and S.O.S.
Neither did the agency contend, as it had in Procter & Gamble, that the acquisition de-
prived the market of the "actual potential competition" effects being exerted by the acquir-
ing firm from the "wings" of the industry prior to the merger. See note 81 supra. Rather,
the FTC argued that the transfer to S.O.S. of General Foods' advertising, marketing, and
financial advantages would have the effect of raising "to virtually insurmountable heights"
the barriers to entry into this industry, thus further insulating this concentrated industry
from the threat of new entry. 69 F.T.C. at 426. In short, the projected lessening of potential
competition was considered to be a result of the entrenchment effects (i.e., heightened entry
barriers) of the merger; it was not presented as a separate theory of illegality.
The Commission's sole reliance on the entrenchment theory led Commissioner Elman,
who drafted the FTC's opinion in Procter & Gamble, to dissent in General Foods. Writing
before the Supreme Court's decision in Procter & Gamble, Commissioner Elman contended
that, in the then novel area of product extension mergers, a combination of entrenchment
and potential competition effects should be shown in order to make out a section 7 viola-
tion. Id. at 450-51, 456-57 (Elman, C., dissenting).
117. For example, the court noted, "[w]e do not read Clorox as holding that 'product
extension' mergers must involve the elimination of. . .potential competition [from the ac-
quiring firm] to run afoul of the Clayton Act." General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936,
946 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968). It then observed, approvingly: "[Tihe
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adopted the general findings of the FTC, which emphasized the
structural effects of the acquisition. s In particular, the court ac-
cepted the FTC's prediction that the industry structure after the
merger would be significantly less conducive to competition and
deconcentration than it had been before the merger because of the
alteration of competitive relationships within the industry.119 Po-
tential competitors would be deterred from entering the industry,
and existing competitors would be intimidated from competing ag-
gressively because of their fear of retaliation from the dispropor-
tionately large acquiring firm.120 In short, the acquisition promised
to transform an already concentrated industry into "an even more
rigid oligopoly." 21
The first Justice Department-initiated suit to advance the en-
trenchment theory was United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods
Co.,1 22 in which the Justice Department sought to enjoin Wilson's
acquisition of Nissen, the nation's leading manufacturer of gym-
& 123 Frnastics equipment. This was another product extension acquisi-
tion; Wilson was the leading manufacturer and distributor of a
wide line of sporting goods and equipment, but it had not previ-
ously engaged in the gymnastics end of that market.1 24 Because of
Wilson's position as "one of a recognized small group of large po-
tential entrants, waiting on the edge of the [gymnastics equip-
ment] market, 1 25 the case obviously lent itself to analysis along
potential competition lines. Although the Justice Department
sought to make a case under both branches of the potential compe-
tition doctrine, 2 6 Judge Marovitz concluded that the potential
competition factor "would not be sufficient to block the merger. 121
Commission's finding that potential competition was reduced by the instant merger is based
on its finding that the substitution of G.F. for the smaller S.O.S. Company increased the
difficulty of entering the market, and the reduction of potential competition was a predict-
able consequence." Id.
118. See note 116 supra.
119. General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 945-46 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 919 (1968).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 946.
122. 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
123. Id. at 545.
124. Id. at 546. Wilson itself was a subsidiary of a large conglomerate, Ling-Temco-
Vought, Inc. Id. at 544.
125. Id. at 563.
126. Id. at 551, 559. For an explanation of the two branches of the potential competition
doctrine, see note 81 supra.
127. Id. at 563.
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But the government had also advanced the entrenchment doctrine
as an "independent basis"'1 8 for enjoining the acquisition. 12 9 Em-
phasizing the structural changes that were likely to occur due to
the "casting of a relative colossus (Wilson-LTV) into the midst of
a group of small competitors,"'3 0 the District Court found the pre-
dicted entrenchment effects to be "more probable than not"'31 and
enjoined the merger. Although it is possible to construe Wilson as
relying on an aggregation of effects, 132 it seems clear that the now
familiar entrenchment concerns were considered by Judge
Marovitz to be controlling and sufficient to enjoin the merger. S
Tendency to Narrow the Application of the Theory
In light of the uncertainty concerning the independent status of
the entrenchment doctrine, it is not surprising that many lower
courts have tended to construe the doctrine narrowly. This ten-
dency is illustrated by two cases in which the courts accepted the
entrenchment doctrine in principle, but found the records before
them inadequate to support predictions of entrenchment. In
United States v. Crowell, Collier and Macmillan, Inc.,3 the Jus-
tice Department challenged the acquisition of the nation's leading
band uniform manufacturer and distributor by a large, diversified
firm which already had subsidiaries holding substantial positions
in the publishing industry, particularly the educational and musi-
128. Id. at 551.
129. The entrenchment argument was that the merger "would entrench and possibly
increase Nissen's already leading market position in gymnastics apparatus, while at the
same time discouraging smaller competitors from aggressive competition with Nissen and
deterring other companies from entering the market." Id.
130. Id. at 554.
131. Id. at 556.
132. The court considered at length each of the Justice Department's three profferred
theories: entrenchment, potential competition, and the entrenchment of the acquiring firm
in its position as the leader in the entire sporting goods market. Id. at 551, 563-66.
133. The district court summarized the probable effects of the acquisitions as follows:
(1) .. .Nissen's competitive position will likely improve from the merger but cer-
tainly will not decline with Wilson's backing, and this is due in part, at least, to
the marketing advantage Nissen's products will likely receive when marketed by
Wilson dealers; (2) ...the smaller rivals of Nissen .. .psychologically will fear
the Wilson-Nissen combine, with the probable result in the long run that the in-
dustry would be transformed into a tighter oligopoly featuring large diversified
companies with no serious threat from potential competitors; and (3) ... small
potential entrants will be deterred from entering as a result of the merger.
Id. at 559.
134. 361 F. Supp. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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cal branches of that industry. " Among the theories advanced by
the Government was the entrenchment theory." 6 The theory pre-
dicted that promotional activities financed by the deep pocket of
the acquiring firm and the superior access to educational custom-
ers enjoyed by its existing education-related subsidiaries would
give the acquired firm advantages which would have the en-
trenching effects described in the earlier cases. The court found
that these alleged "advantages" would be of no consequence, how-
ever, in view of the way purchasing decisions were customarily
made with respect to band uniforms. Unusual levels of advertising
or an extra large sales force with ready access to school purchasing
officials (who were found to be more sophisticated in their major
purchasing decisions than consumers of liquid bleach) would not in
fact be of any advantage to the acquired firm. 3 7 Hence, existing
rivals could not be expected to be intimidated, nor would potential
entrants.
Similarly, in United States v. Black and "Decker Mfg. Co.,138 a
district court found that the advantages which the acquiring par-
ent might bestow upon its newly acquired subsidiary to be of little
moment, given the charcter of the market in which the acquired
firm competed. Black and Decker, the leading manufacturer of
portable electric tools, was acquiring McCulloch, a leading manu-
facturer of gasoline powered chain saws.139 Although the court con-
ceded that national advertising was becoming increasingly impor-
tant in the chain saw market, it concluded that any additional
advertising by McCulloch made possible by the acquisition would
not entrench its position. In support of this conclusion, the court
determined that advertising is less influential for products that are
not physically identical than it is for fungible products, such as the
liquid bleach involved in Procter & Gamble. In addition, several
existing chain saw manufacturers were found to be at least as
financially strong as Black and Decker; thus, they could match any
advertising budget Black and Decker might offer. " 0
135. Id. at 985-87. The suit also attacked another recent acquisition by Crowell, Collier,
but the mergers were analyzed independently, and the band uniform merger amply illus-
trates the point.
136. Id. at 991.
137. Id. at 992.
138. 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976).
139. Id. at 734-35.
140. Id. at 774-76. This limitation on the entrenchment theory tends to overlook the
impact of the acquisition on the overall structure of the acquired firm's industry. There was
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Absence of Recent Supreme Court Clarification
In each of the seminal Supreme Court cases advancing the en-
trenchment concept in the mid-1960's, the Court was able to point
to post-acquisition evidence of apparent efforts by the acquiring
firm to exercise the leverage which the entrenchment theory pre-
dicted it would have-the deep pocket for excessive promotion and
price-cutting in the case of Procter & Gamble," and the reciprocal
buying power in the case of Consolidated Foods.'" Thus, in
neither of those cases did the Court have to rely entirely on mere
predictions of adverse market structure changes which might.flow
from the acquisitions. Although these early cases can be read as
authorizing the FTC and lower courts to base their decisions on
such predictions, the Supreme Court's attention to post-acquisi-
tion evidence in each of them could severely limit their preceden-
tial value. The Court's recent unenthusiastic attitude toward the
potential competition doctrine 14 warrants inquiry into whether the
Court has indeed restricted the scope of the entrenchment doc-
trine. Unfortunately, recent Supreme Court opinions do little to
clarify the contours of the entrenchment doctrine.
In the Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Ford Motor Co. v.
United States,'4 Justice Douglas drafted a plurality opinion ap-
proving a district court's partial reliance on the entrenchment doc-
trine. The district court had condemned Ford's acquisition of Elec-
tric Autolite Company, a spark plug manufacturer. 45 This was a
vertical as well as a product extension merger,14 6 and there were
evidence in Black & Decker, for example, that the acquisition may have triggered some
defensive mergers involving smaller firms which had not feared an independent McCulloch.
Although the court found this evidence to be unconvincing, id. at 775 n.81, it could have
found that one effect of Black and Decker's acquisition was to induce a more concentrated
and less competitive market structure in the chain saw market. But the court chose to focus
on McCulloch's prospects rather than those for the industry as a whole.
141. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 579 n.3 (1967).
142. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 596 (1965).
143. See text accompanying notes 57-60 supra.
144. 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
145. " The district court had found that the acquisition "had the effect of raising the bar-
riers to entry in to [sic] [the sparkplug] market [and] . . . transmitting the rigidity of the
oligopolistic structure of the automobile industry to the spark plug industry, thus reducing
the chances for future deconcentration of the spark plug market ... " Id. at 568, quoting
315 F. Supp. at 375.
146. Spark plugs are included as original equipment on new cars. In that sense, Ford was
integrating backward by acquiring a supplier. But since Ford was also "anxious" to partici-
pate in the spark plug replacement market, the merger also had product extension charac-
teristics. 405 U.S. at 565.
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several grounds on which to affirm the divestiture order. 7 Al-
though Justice Douglas did highlight entrenchment language from
the district court's findings, his opinion spoke only for himself and
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White. The remaining opinions in
the Ford case left the status of the entrenchment doctrine some-
what cloudy.14 8
A year after Ford, in United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,1 4 9
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined in a plurality
opinion drafted by Justice White which acknowledged that section
7 "bars certain acquisitions of a market competitor by a noncom-
petitor, such as a merger by an entrant who threatens to dominate
the market or otherwise upset market conditions to the detriment
of competition. . ... ,15 This passage, which cites approvingly the
entrenchment passage in the Procter & Gamble opinion, would in-
dicate that Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun do accept
the full scope of the entrenchment doctrine. The Falstaff votes of
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, when added to those
of the three surviving Justices who joined Justice Douglas's plural-
ity opinion in Ford,151 would suggest that there is presently a five-
justice majority on the Supreme Court which has expressed sup-
port for the entrenchment doctrine. But the extent of Justice
Blackmun's and Chief Justice Burger's support is put in question
by their concurrence in the majority opinion in the next merger
case decided by the Supreme Court, United States v. Marine Ban-
corporation, Inc.1 52
Previous references to Marine Bancorporation have emphasized
the hostility with which the Supreme Court's "new antitrust ma-
147. These grounds included vertical foreclosure, see United States v. E.I. duPont De
Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1956), and even the "wings effect" branch of the potential
competition doctrine. See note 81 supra.
148. Separate opinions were filed by Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Chief Justice Bur-
ger, all of whom concurred at least partially in the result. Ford Motor Co. v. United States,
405 U.S. 562, 578-79, 582, 595 (1972). Justice Stewart's opinion contains language consistent
with the entrenchment doctrine's focus on "probable future trends in the ... market" and
preserving opportunities for "measurable deconcentration in the market." Id. at 580-81
(Stewart, J., concurring). Although Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun seemed to
acquiesce in the plurality's endorsement of all of the grounds on which the district court
had relied, their separate opinions focused almost entirely on the remedial aspects of the
case. See id. at 582-95 (Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., concurring). Justices Powell and
Rehnquist did not participate in this case.
149. 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
150. Id. at 531 (emphasis added).
151. Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall joined Justice Douglas's opinion in Ford.
152. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
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jority" treated the potential competition doctrine. 153 The entrench-
ment doctrine may have been spared a similar fate only because
the Justice Department was not asserting an entrenchment theory.
A footnote in the majority opinion took note of the doctrine, citing
passages from both Procter & Gamble and Falstaff, only to ob-
serve that the Court had not been asked to apply the doctrine in
this case.15" This technically neutral statement, as the Supreme
Court's most recent expression relating to the entrenchment doc-
trine, only underlines the uncertainty regarding the extent of the
doctrine's present support. However, the Marine Bancorporation
opinion provides little reason to doubt the existence of the gerry-
mandered majority of supporters from the Ford and Falstaff opin-
ions.15 5 Thus, until there is further guidance from the Supreme
Court, it is fair to conclude that a current majority of the Court
continues to recognize the entrenchment doctrine as a viable, inde-
pendent basis upon which to predicate a section 7 challenge to a
conglomerate merger. 15
Current Dimensions of the Doctrine
A synthesis of opinions rendered by the Supreme Court, lower
courts, and the FTC reveals four essential factors which must be
153. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text.
154. We put aside cases where an acquiring firm's market power, existing capabili-
ties, and proposed merger partner are such that the merger would produce an
enterprise likely to dominate the target market (a concept known as entrench-
ment). See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). Cf. Falstaff Brew-
ing Corp ...... There is no allegation that the instant merger would produce
entrenchment in the [acquired firm's] market.
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 623 n.23 (1974).
155. See text accompanying note 151 supra. This majority is comprised of Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, White, and Chief Justice Burger. In addition, Justice Ste-
vens, a careful interpreter of antitrust precedents, see e.g., National Soc'y of Prof. Engineers
v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978), is a possible supporter of the entrenchment doctrine.
However, since Justice Stevens joined the Court after the decisions analyzed here, his views
on the issue remain a matter for conjecture.
156. The wording of footnote 23 in Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 623 n.23, quoted
at note 154 supra, suggests that the Justices who joined in that opinion may have taken a
restricted view of the entrenchment doctrine. The language of the footnote seems to concep-
tualize entrenchment as being concerned solely with the possibility that the acquired firm
will dominate its market, thus implicating only the "tendency-to-monopolize" part of § 7's
"effects" clause. Yet, neither of the entrenchment passages cited in the footnote restricted
the entrenchment doctrine in this way. Thus, it would be reading too much into this casual
footnote to conclude that the Court meant to suggest that it no longer considers the en-
trenchment theory relevant to the other portion of § 7's "effects" clause, which focuses sim-
ply on a merger's propensity to substantially lessen competition. See text accompanying
notes 97-98 supra.
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established to make out a section 7 violation under the entrench-
ment doctrine.
1. Market Position of the Acquired and Acquiring Firms
Some lower courts have held that the entrenchment doctrine ap-
plies only where the acquired firm is the dominant firm in its mar-
ket. 157 Although the acquired firm fit this description in two of the
Supreme Court cases which focused squarely on entrenchment,"'8
the Court has never stated that such a dominant status is indis-
pensable for invoking entrenchment analysis. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has applied entrenchment analysis where the acquired firm
was neither dominant nor the leading firm in its industry. 159 En-
trenchment analysis focuses on the likelihood that smaller firms in
the acquired firm's market and potential entrants to that market
will be intimidated by competitive advantages which will become
available to the acquired firm as a result of the acquisition. The
acquired firm's status as one of the leading firms in its market
should suffice to establish the possibility of these intimidating ef-
fects and thus commence entrenchment analysis."*0 Whether the
acquired firm is characterized as dominant or leading, the theory
requires that the firm compete in a concentrated market before en-
trenchment effects will be found.16' Since most major markets in
157. See, e.g., United States v. Crowell, Collier & Macmillan, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 983, 991
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19, 24 (D.
Conn. 1970), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971).
158. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 528 (1973) (acquired firm
largest in relevant market); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 570-71 (1967) (ac-
quired firm dominant nationally).
159. In Ford, the acquired firm was a poor third in a concentrated market, accounting
for only 15% of the national market. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 566
(1972). In Consolidated Foods, the acquired firm was a distant second in a concentrated
market. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 595 (1965).
160. SULLIVAN, supra note 25, at 655-56.
161. If the relevant market were not concentrated, any effects caused by the proposed
merger would be difficult to distinguish from the effects which would accompany indepen-
dent entry by the acquiring firm. Every Supreme Court opinion discussing the entrench-
ment concept has emphasized the necessity of a concentrated market. United States v. Fal-
staff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 550-51, 558-59 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring); Ford
Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 566, 568 (1972); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
386 U.S. 568, 571 (1967); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 595 (1965). On the
other hand, the general statement of the doctrine in Justice White's plurality opinion in
Falstaff does not include this limitation: "[Section 7] . . . bars certain acquisitions of a
market competitor by a non-competitor, such as a merger by an entrant who threatens to
dominate the market or otherwise upset market conditions to the detriment of competi-
tion .. " 410 U.S. at 531. Nor does the FTC's most recent discussion of the entrenchment
doctrine emphasize the concentration issue. Heublein, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
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our economy are classified as concentrated,162 and since rarely will
a firm be capable of being characterized as leading or dominant in
an unconcentrated market, this "concentrated market" condition
is not inappropriately limiting.
Several courts have suggested that the acquiring firm must have
certain characteristics in order to invoke entrenchment analysis. It
has been suggested that the acquiring firm must be significantly
larger than the acquired firm and its competitors, 163 or the acquir-
ing firm must itself be a leading firm in a product line that is
closely related to that of the acquired firm.16 These conditions
may have been present in the Supreme Court cases exploring the
entrenchment doctrine, but each of those cases involved product
extension or market extension mergers, where such factors would
be expected. The Court has never suggested that the doctrine is
limited to the facts of those cases. Rather, the cases suggest that
the acquiring firm need only be capable of bestowing some signifi-
cant competitive advantage upon the acquired firm. Although this
capability often will be derived from the acquiring firm's size in
comparison with the leading firms in the acquired firm's industry,
disproportionate size is not considered to be a requirement of the
doctrine.'65 Nor is it necessary that the acquiring firm must be par-
ticipating in a market closely related to that of the acquired firm.
A pure conglomerate acquisition'66 is capable of producing the
kind of significant advantages postulated by the theory, even
though the acquiring firm would not have been participating in a
related market. 67
21,763, at 21,936, 21,948 (1980). The Justice Department's merger guidelines, however, sug-
gest entrenchment problems are limited to concentrated markets. 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
$ 4510, at 6881, 6888-89 (1981).
162. "[S]omething in excess of half of all American manufacturing industry can be cate-
gorized as oligopolistic." SCHERER, supra note 1, at 67.
163. See, e.g., United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19, 24 (D.
Conn. 1970); Carrier Corp. v. United Technologies Corp., 1978-2 Trade Cas. 62,393, at
76,360, 76,365 (N.D.N.Y.).
164. See, e.g., Missouri-Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 859 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974).
165. See id. at 865-66.
166. See notes 5-6 supra.
167. Cf. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972). The aborted ITT
cases were designed to test the entrenchment doctrine in a pure conglomerate context.
United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970); United
States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dis-
missed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971). Although the Government lost in the lower court in each case,
neither district court opinion suggested that the entrenchment theory was inapplicable in
assessing the effects of pure conglomerate acquisitions. The district courts merely found
1982]
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In summary, entrenchment analysis may be invoked (a) when-
ever the acquired firm is a significant competitor in a concentrated
market and (b) the acquiring firm is in a position to bestow upon
the acquired firm a significant competitive advantage which can be
expected to aggravate the competitive situation in the acquired
firm's market.
2. Types of Advantages
A number of advantages bestowed upon an acquired firm may be
considered potentially entrenching, including: advertising advan-
tages which flow from the deep pocket of the new parent and the
parent's ability to purchase advertising at a cheaper rate than can
the competitors of the acquired firm;1'8 other marketing advan-
tages, such as superior access to potential retailers due to contacts,
sales force, brand names, or a broad line of related products mar-
keted by the acquiring firm;169 and the cheaper capital costs that
larger firms tend to enjoy.17 0 Also, "cost savings," presumably at-
tributable to greater efficiency, have been categorized on occasion
as an "unfair advantage. '17 1
It is neither possible nor desirable to set forth an exhaustive list
of advantages. As Commissioner Pitofsky recently wrote for the
FTC, "[a]rguably any substantial competitive advantage resulting
from the acquiring firm's size disparity or resources" may be
sufficient.17 2
that the alleged anticompetitive effects had not been proven on the records presented.
United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19, 33 (D. Conn. 1970);
United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766, 778 (D. Conn. 1969),
appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971).
168. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); General Foods Corp. V. FTC,
386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968).
169. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Wilson Sport-
ing Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. III. 1968). The last two listed factors are presumed to
be indicative of a type of subtle tying or leverage that may influence retailers in the same
manner that subtle, uncoerced reciprocity was thought to have affected industrial buyers of
dehydrated onions and garlic in FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965). See
text accompanying notes 99-106 supra.
170. United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963); United States v.
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1970), appeal dismissed, 404
U.S. 801 (1971).
171. The initial FTC inquiries into the entrenchment doctrine stressed this factor. Gen-
eral Foods Corp., 69 F.T.C. 380, 424 (1966); Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465, 1563
(1963). The appropriateness of treating cost savings as a negative factor is considered in
notes 228-35 infra and accompanying text.
172. Heublein, Inc., 3 TRADE RFG. REP. (CCH) 21,763, at 21,936, 21,948 (1980).
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3. Uniqueness of Advantages
For the entrenchment doctrine to apply to a conglomerate acqui-
sition, the advantages offered by the acquiring firm must be in
some sense unique. 73 If the advantages are possessed or indepen-
dently obtainable by competitors of the acquired firm, other than
by defensive mergers of their own, then the transfer of the advan-
tages from the acquiring firm to the acquired firm could not be
expected to unsettle existing competitive relationships in the ac-
quired firm's market. Thus, when the alleged advantages relate to
financial power, e.g., lower capital costs, the advantages will only
be unique if the acquiring firm's financial power is disproportion-
ately large vis-a-vis the leading firms in the acquired company's
industry.
Disproportionate size often explains the uniqueness of other
types of advantages, such as superior access to outlets through an
established sales force,17 4 or market acceptance associated with a
heavily advertised and differentiated brand name or product
line.1 75 But the disproportionate size of an acquiring firm is not the
only basis for a finding that the acquisition confers a unique bene-
fit on the acquired firm. 17 An advantage of good will or superior
access to outlets resulting from a small but well ensconced sales
force or established consumer acceptance could be transferred by a
firm that did not enjoy disproportionate size.17 7
173. Missouri-Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1974); United
States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976); Heublein, Inc., 3 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 21,763, at 21,936 (1980). Cf. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter-
prises, 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (competitive advantages are of no antitrust significance unless
they are unique).
174. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
175. General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 939 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
919 (1968); General Foods Corp., 69 F.T.C. 380, 425 (1966). See also Abrams, Exploiting
Proven Brand Names Can Cut Risk of New Products, Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1981, at 25, col.
1.
176. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 563-64 (N.D. Ill.
1968). The court was partially influenced by the argument that tiny Nissen might actually
entrench giant Wilson by bringing into the Wilson line the universally accepted premier line
of gymnastics equipment. The court stated that it "would hesitate to block [the] merger on
this ground alone," id. at 563, but it concluded that the point "constitutes a meaningful
argument." Id.
177. No matter how large the acquiring firm, some advantages may not in fact be trans-
ferable. Cf. United States v. Crowell, Collier & Macmillan, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 983 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), in which the court found advertising advantages to be inconsequential where pur-
chasers of the acquired firm's product line were considered so sophisticated in their
purchasing decisions that they would not be influenced by excessive advertising. Other ad-
vantages, particularly of a psychological nature, may prove to be inconsequential in view of
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4. Realistically Predictable Substantial Lessening of
Competition
A final condition upon the applicability of the entrenchment
doctrine is a showing that the extension of unique advantages from
the acquiring firm to the acquired firm is expected with reasonable
probability 7 8 to result in a substantial lessening of competition in
a relevant market, or a serious tendency for either the acquired or
acquiring firm to achieve a monopoly in its market. This, after all,
is the requirement of section 7's "effects" clause.
The most commonly-mentioned adverse effect of a conglomerate
merger is the aggravation of oligopolistic behavior in the acquired
firm's market.1 7" There may be an increased susceptibility to price
leadership, with established firms following the lead of the newly
entrenched firm. 80 Even if overt price leadership does not develop,
there may be a diminution of competitive aggressiveness on the
part of the incrementally intimidated rivals of the acquired firm. " '
Because the doctrine's applicability is dependent upon the ac-
quired firm's market being fairly concentrated," 2 any diminution
in competitive behavior is considered to be a serious effect. 83 This
effect is appraised by looking at the likely conduct and develop-
ment of the industry as a whole, not just the acquired firm, even
though the focus must be on specific industry-wide structural or
behavioral changes likely to be induced by the acquisition of that
firm.'"
customer buying behavior and sophistication. See text accompanying notes 134-37 supra.
178. It is well settled that the Clayton Act does not require certainty of anticompetitive
effects to make out a § 7 violation. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323
(1962). Discussion of the proper standard to evaluate the probability of adverse entrench-
ment effects is postponed to notes 256-78 infra and accompanying text.
179. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 568-69 (1972); FTC v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1967); General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 945-46 (3d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968).
180. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1967).
181. Id.; General Foods v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 946 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
919 (1968); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 556 (N.D. Ill.
1968).
182. See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
183. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 568 (1972); Procter & Gamble Co.,
63 F.T.C. 1465, 1577 (1963); cf. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 365
n.42 (1963) (horizontal merger case holding that "if concentration is already great, the im-
portance of preventing even slight increases in concentration and so preserving the possibil-
ity of eventual deconcentration is correspondingly great.").
184. Cf. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 621 (1974) ("[I]n no
previous § 7 case has the court determined the legality of a merger by measuring its effects
on areas where the acquired firm is not a direct competitor."); United States v. Interna-
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Another anticompetitive structural effect frequently emphasized
by the courts is the aggravation of barriers to entry resulting from
the transfer of the acquiring firm's advantages to the already sig-
nificant acquired firm. 185 Whatever the advantages may be, poten-
tial entrants must now contemplate matching or overcoming those
new advantages if entry is to be profitable. Even if the acquired
firm's market is already protected by barriers to entry, the margi-
nal effect of the acquisition still may be to make the eventual
deconcentration of that market less likely, a significant effect in
concentrated markets. 186
For an acquired firm already dominant in its industry, as was
the case in Procter & Gamble,8 7 the new advantages could be so
decisive that monopoly power would likely result. 88 This would es-
tablish a violation of the "tendency to monopolize" branch of sec-
tion 7's "effects" clause, and would serve as a clear indication of a
probable substantial lessening of competition.
There are other effects which are less amenable to documenta-
tion, but which continue to attract inquiry. One of these is the
"triggering effect" which may result from the new relationship es-
tablished by a significant merger.'80 Merger waves sometimes wash
through industries leading to increased concentration. 90 A merger
tional Tel. & Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19, 52 (D. Conn. 1970), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S.
801 (1971) (that "anticompetitive consequences will appear in numerous though undesig-
nated individual 'lines of commerce'" is insufficient to establish a § 7 violation).
185. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 568 (1972); FTC v. Procter & Gam-
ble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 579 (1967); General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 946 (3d Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F.
Supp. 543, 557 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
186. See note 183 supra. See also United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526,
558-59 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring).
187. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
188. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 531 (1973); Procter & Gam-
ble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465 (1963); cf. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S.
602, 623 n.23 (1974) (acknowledging that conglomerate mergers producing "an enterprise
likely to dominate the target market" have been held to violate § 7).
189. See General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 946 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 919 (1968); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Corp., 288 F. Supp. 543, 558 (N.D.
I11. 1968); General Foods Corp., 69 F.T.C. 380, 424 (1966); cf. United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271, 279 n.6 (1964); Brown Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,
343-44 (1962); Pillsbury Mills, 50 F.T.C. 555, 572-73 (1953) (existenice of a merger trend in
an industry is relevant to an appraisal of competitive effects).
190. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966) (retail grocery
chains); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964) (aluminum con-
ducter manufacturers); Heublein, Inc., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 21,763, at 21,936 (1980)
(wineries). Consider the current trend of large financial conglomerates acquiring major Wall
Street securities firms, as summarized in Hutton Stake of 2.5% Bought by Transamerica,
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wave may be triggered by the need to become large enough to ex-
ploit available economies of scale,191 or it may be triggered by a
defensive instinct that drives firms to be as large as their rivals
even where additional economies of scale are not obtainable.19 2 A
given merger trend may be predominantly horizontal, vertical, or
conglomerate. In the case of a conglomerate trend, when several
independent factors in a market each become subsidiaries of large,
diversified concerns, a sense of heightened interdependence, some-
times referred to as "cross-market linkage," between the conglom-
erate parents may develop." '9 The conglomerates, sensitive to their
interdependence, may be inclined to have their subsidiaries pursue
a policy of mutual forbearance. 94 One outsider's entry into'a mar-
Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1981, at 5, col. 1.
191. Even then, however, the merger wave does not necessarily have a positive or even a
neutral effect on competitive conditions in an industry. The merger also may be contrary to
non-efficiency related policies reflected in § 7. See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 540-43 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 332-33, 344-45 (1962). See also FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S.
568, 580 (1967).
192. Many large firms are larger than is necessary to achieve manufacturing economies
of scale, although there may be multiplant economies (or diseconomies) of scale. AREEDA,
supra note 13, at 29-34; SCHERER, supra note 1, at 133-41. Compare Liebler, Industrial
Concentration, Efficiency, and Antitrust Reform: Another View, 12 Sw. U. L. REV. 379
(1981), with Asch, Industrial Concentration, Efficiency, and Antitrust Reform Once Again:
A Reply to Professor Liebler, 12 Sw. U. L. REV. 405 (1981). See also Klein, Some Firms
Fight Ills of Bigness by Keeping Employee Units Small, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1982, at 1, col.
6 (southwest ed.): "A growing body of opinion has it that the 'economies of scale' made
possible by bigness often are more than nullified by organizational rigidities and
bottlenecks."
193. See Baker, Potential Competition in Banking: After Greely, What?, 90 BANKING
L.J. 362 (1973); Solomon, Bank Merger Policy and Problems: A Linkage Theory of Oligop-
oly, 89 BANKING L.J. 116 (1972); 1 Proposed Small and Independent Business Protection
Act of 1979: Hearings (Merger & Economic Concentration) on S.600 before the. Subcommit-
tee on Antitrust, Monopoly & Business Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1979) (Statement of John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Antitrust Division). But see Areeda & Turner, Conglomerate Mergers: Extended Inter-
dependence and Effects on Interindustry Competition on Grounds for Condemnation, 127
U. PA. L. REV. 1082 (1979).
194. This conclusion is an extension of traditional oligopoly theory. See generally
SCHERER, supra note 1, at 152. The prospect of quick retaliation operates as a disincen-
tive toward aggressive pricing oi promotion strategies. Within an oligopoly of conglomerates,
moreover, the opportunities for retaliation are broader than in the single product oligopoly.
Thus, Conglomerate A will be reluctant to have its wine subsidiary become aggressive, for it
fears retaliation not only from the wine subsidiaries of Conglomerates B, C, and D, but also
from their other subsidiaries, which may be holding unexploited advantages that could in-
jure another subsidiary of Conglomerate A quite clearly. As more and more product markets
become controlled by conglomerate firms,-the number of markets in which a given conglom-
erate faces another conglomerate multiplies, and the tendency for intermarket forbearance
becomes even stronger.
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ket by the acquisition of a leader in that market may trigger a rush
of defensive mergers which would bring about the absorption of
that market into the hands of a group of conglomerates who are
perhaps already exercising this mutual forbearance policy in other
markets where their subsidiaries meet each other. In this manner,
one acquisition which fits the entrenchment doctrine's definitional
prerequisites may produce a substantial probability of general
market entrenchment in the acquired firms industry.19 5
THE CONSISTENCY OF ENTRENCHMENT ANALYSIS WITH THE POLICIES
OF SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
Although the Supreme Court's "new antitrust majority"' " has
not eliminated the theory of entrenchment as an approach for ana-
lyzing conglomerate mergers, 97 it must be noted that the en-
trenchment doctrine recently has been subjected to serious criti-
cism.11e This raises the question of whether the doctrine should be
revived and aggressively applied. The inherent consistency of the
doctrine with the policies underlying section 7 of the Clayton
Act1 99 and federal antitrust laws in general00 suggests that con-
cerns voiced by critics of the doctrine are unwarranted.
Consistency with Legislative History of Section 7
The legislative history of amended section 7 of the Clayton Act
indicates that the basic policy objective of the statute is to forestall
any trend or tendency toward economic concentration resulting
from mergers and acquisitions2 01 The drafters of section 7 were
concerned with economic concentration not only because of the be-
lief that it is inimical to competition, but also because of the belief
that economic power carries with it disturbing degrees of political
power and even a certain unaccountable power over social institu-
tions20 2 Yet, the language of section 7's "effects" clause clearly in-
195. Although the Supreme Court's Marine Bancorporation opinion exhibited consider-
able skepticism toward the linkage theory of oligopoly, the theory was not rejected in princi-
ple, at least with respect to entrenchment type cases. See United States v. Marine Bancor-
poration, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 620-23, 623 n. 23 (1974).
196. See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
197. See notes 144-56 supra and accompanying text.
198. See notes 71-72 supra and notes 217-37 infra and accompanying text.
199. See notes 201-05 infra and accompanying text.
200. See notes 206-16 infra and accompanying text.
201. See notes 8-32 supra and accompanying text.
202. See text accompanying note 32 supra. See also 4 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13,
V 904, at 11; Blake, Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 73 COLUM. L. Rv. 555,
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dicates that Congress intended "to restrain mergers only to the ex-
tent that such combinations may tend to lessen competition. '20 3
The use of the term "competition" rather than "concentration" in
the statutory language apparently reflects Congress' recognition
that acquisitions increasing concentration within a given market
are likely to tend to lessen competition. In fact, the legislative his-
tory of amended section 7 reveals that Congress explicitly contem-
plated that, in applying the effect on competition test, courts
would consider structural factors such as those focused on by the
entrenchment doctrine. The House report accompanying the 1950
amendments stated that a probable substantial lessening of com-
petition might be established by a showing of an "increase in the
relative size of the enterprise making the acquisition to such a
point that its advantage over its competitors threatens to be deci-
sive. "204 Because the entrenchment doctrine focuses on structural
changes that can be predicted to lessen competition in a particular
industry, the doctrine is consistent with the objectives of section 7,
as expressed in its legislative history.2 5
Consistency with General Antitrust Policy
The basic thrust of federal antitrust policy is to prevent undue
584-85 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Blake]; Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merg-
ing of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 236-37 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Bok];
Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1060-65 (1979). See
generally United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 540-43 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). For recent corroboration of the reasons for these fears, see notes 229-32 infra
and accompanying text.
203. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis added). See
also United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19, 51-54 (D. Conn.
1970), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971). Professors Areeda and Turner emphasize this
point in support of the suggestion that the "undeniable" congressional concern with non-
economic values should be given only a "limited role" in the application of § 7 of the Clay-
ton Act. 4 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, 1 904, at 11-14.
204. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949). It is precisely this relationship
between industry structure and competition, recognized by the Supreme Court in Procter &
Gamble and Consolidated Foods, which forms the foundation for the entrenchment doc-
trine. See notes 75-106 supra and accompanying text.
205. Application of § 7 can serve both economic and non-economic policy concurrently.
If a merger can be predicted to lead to increases in or insulation of undesirable levels of
concentration in a given market, and if there is an inverse relationship between concentra-
tion and competition in that market, then condemning such a merger would further both
the economic and the non-economic policies reflected in the statute. See note 202 supra and
accompanying text. Cf. Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Effi-
ciency, What Else Counts? 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1191, 1202-03 (1977) (efficiency and nonef-
ficiency goals of antitrust are frequently not in conflict).
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concentrations of economic power. 06 A faithful recognition of this
policy has led the courts to articulate entrenchment-like concerns
in cases dealing with problems other than conglomerate mergers.207
Non-conglomerate merger opinions frequently have pointed to en-
trenchment-like effects as grounds for condemning acquisitions
which threatened to accelerate the rate of concentration in particu-
lar industries. 08 These cases have emphasized the need to preserve
industry structures in deconcentrated states, and, where an indus-
try's structure is already concentrated, to preserve opportunities
for deconcentration .2 9 These non-conglomerate merger cases re-
veal a sensitivity for the tendency of a given merger to initiate or
perpetuate a trend toward a level of concentration in an industry
which could be presumed to lead to a substantial lessening of com-
petition in that industry.2 ' 0 This concept, sometimes described as
"triggering effect," established that in appraising the probable ulti-
mate effect a merger will have on competition, it is permissible to
consider, as does the entrenchment theory,21' other possible future
mergers which might be spawned by that merger. Horizontal and
vertical merger opinions also evince a concern with the possible
entrenchment of a single firm with undue market power, as it
threatens to grow through mergers and acquisitions to a size which
inherently would intimidate smaller existing and potential
206. This point has been ably developed by Blake, supra note 202, at 575-78, 584-85 and
Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers, supra note 59, at 33-35.
207. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 56-62 (1911); United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428-29 (2d Cir. 1945).
208. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-78 (1966); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-63 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 343-46 (1962).
209. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 365 n.42 (1963).
210. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), the Court considered the
possibility that the challenged merger would encourage subsequent acquisitions, stating: "If
a merger achieving 5% control were now approved, we might be required to approve future
merger efforts by Brown's competitors seeking similar market shares. The oligopoly Con-
gress sought to avoid would then be furthered .. " Id. at 343-44. See also United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), expressing the fear that approval of the
merger in question would allow any firm "to embark on a series of mergers that would make
it in the end as large as the industry leader." Id. at 370. In United States v. Von's Grocery,
384 U.S. 270 (1966), the Court stated that:
It is enough for us that Congress feared that a market marked at the same time by
both a continuous decline in the number of small businesses and a large number
of mergers would slowly but inevitably gravitate from a market of many small
competitors to one dominated by one or a few giants, and competition would
thereby be destroyed.
211. See text accompanying notes 189-95 supra.
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competitors.212
It is fair to say, then, that entrenchment considerations are well
established within the body of case law decided under section 7,
and the development of the entrenchment doctrine in the conglom-
erate sphere is thus quite consistent with the development of fed-
eral antimerger policy in general. The merger opinions of the Su-
preme Court's "new antitrust majority," 13 although calling for a
more realistic appraisal of the actual effects on competition that
are likely to follow from a merger under challenge,1 have not re-
jected the basic proposition, established in the earlier line of cases
just reviewed, that section 7 analysis is required to be predictive.2 15
Nor has the new majority stepped back from the proposition that,
212. See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 278 (1966); Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 343-44 (i962). In United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), Judge Weinfeld indicated that an increase in the
absolute size of a firm accomplished through acquisition may give rise to a § 7 violation,
stating: "Even in a case where two companies operate primarily in separate areas, a merger
can have an adverse effect on competition in that the enhanced strength of the merged
company may give it such an undue advantage in each area that competition may be sub-
stantially lessened." Id. at 600.
One particularly intriguing employment of entrenchment language is found in then-Cir-
cuit Judge Burger's opinion affirming the FTC's condemnation of Reynolds Metals Com-
pany's vertical acquisition of the leading converter of aluminum foil for the florist trade:
Arrow's assimilation into Reynolds' enormous capital structure and resources
gave Arrow an immediate advantage over its competitors who were contending for
a share of the market for florist foil. The power of the 'deep pocket' or 'rich par-
ent' of one of the florist foil suppliers in a competitive group where previously no
company was very large and all were relatively small opened the possibility and
power to sell at prices approximating cost or below and thus to undercut and rav-
age the less affluent competition ....
Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
In another aluminum industry vertical acquisition, the Supreme Court affirmed, per
curiam, a district court's divestiture order which had been premised on such typical en-
trenchment concerns as the "unlimited funds" of the parent and its superior reputation and
prestige which might benefit the new subsidiary by giving its products the advantage of
preferential consideration by the architects and builders who made the purchasing decisions
in the acquired firm's market. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 233 F. Supp. 718
(E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 382 U.S. 12 (1965).
213. See note 57 supra.
214. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 627-28, 641-42 (1974);
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 497-501 (1974).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 622-23 (1974):
"[I]t is to be remembered that § 7 deals in 'probabilities'...." (emphasis added); United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974): "'[O]nly a further examination
of the particular market-its structure, history and probable future--can provide the ap-
propriate setting for judging the probable anticompetitive effect of the merger.' [Brown
Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S.] at 322." (Emphasis added). See notes 256-78 infra and
accompanying text.
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where reasoned predictions suggest a given merger will lead to a
more concentrated structure in a given industry, there is a pre-
sumption, subject to rebuttal, that that industry will become less
competitive because of the merger.2 "
Appropriateness of Characterizing Entrenchment Effects as
Adverse to Competition
Despite the apparent congruence between entrenchment theory
and basic antitrust policy, some eminent commentators have ques-
tioned whether it is appropriate to presume that entrenchment ef-
fects will have an adverse impact on the level of competition in the
acquired firm's industry. These authors doubt that the factors re-
ferred to in the entrenchment cases as "unfair advantages" ' are
really unfair. These advantages, if they exist at all,218 are said to
result from resource savings attributable to economies of scale or
other efficiencies which are (a) equally available to any firm, and
(b) socially desirable. 19 It is awkward, they suggest, to have an an-
titrust doctrine which posits that the enjoyment of real cost sav-
ings can have anticompetitive consequences. These commentators
question whether the possession of the alleged advantages actually
leads to increased market power for the newly acquired firm or in-
creased concentration in the acquired firm's industry.220 They
point out, for example, that overt exploitation of the alleged ad-
vantages in the predicted fashion would run afoul of other provi-
sions in the federal antitrust laws. 22 1 These commentators also sug-
216. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974). See also
United States v. Citizen's & Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120 (1975). See generally,
Schneider, Evolving Proof Standards Under Section 7 and Mergers in Transitional Mar-
kets: The Securities Industry Example, 1981 Wis. L. REV. 1, 17-36 [hereinafter cited as
Schneider]. Mr. Schneider observes: "[Iln some circumstances-notably in industries under-
going significant regulatory or structural adjustments-evidence other than concentration
data may support a finding of likely adverse effect more emphatically than concentration
data." Id. at 36. Thus, even under the view of the "new antitrust majority," it is not neces-
sary to predict a substantial increase in market concentration, but rather, the required pre-
diction is of a substantially less competitive market structure.
217. See notes 168-72 supra and accompanying text.
218. Doubts as to the existence of the kinds of advantages postulated by the entrench-
ment theory are expressed in 5 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, IV 1134-35, at 202-19;
POSNER & EASTERBROOK, supra note 30, at 938.
219. 5 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, 1 1103b, at 6-7; POSNER & EASTERBROOK, supra
note 31, at 511-12.
220. POSNER & EASTERBROOK, supra note 30, at 511.
221. Overt reciprocity or tying, for example, are probably per se illegal. See 5 AREEDA &
TURNER, supra note 13, 1 1134c, at 206 (tying); id., I 1130a, at 177-78 (reciprocity). But see
Antitrust Chief Baxter Denies Clouding Law or Helping Fuel Recent Rise in Mergers, Wall
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gest the futility of the entrenchment doctrine in preventing the
exploitation of unfair advantages, if they do exist, since they could
be bestowed on a smaller firm in the target market through a pre-
sumably unobjectionable "toehold" acquisition, or exercised inter-
nally by the conglomerate parent who decides to enter an industry
de novo by internal diversification."'
Aside from the internal difficulties and speculative aspects they
find in the entrenchment theory, the opponents of the entrench-
ment doctrine see the application of the doctrine as potentially im-
posing serious harm on the nation's economy. First, they contend
that the application of the entrenchment doctrine would prevent
mergers which could benefit the economy by generating resource
savings and improved efficiency at the acquired firm.22 Second,
they fear that the doctrine would have the effect of insulating inef-
ficient managers from viable takeover threats, thus depriving the
economy of a valuable incentive for efficient management.22 On
this view, conglomerate acquisitions offer the beneficial effect of
shifting "resources to higher valued uses or more skilled users, and
...society gains as a result.' 2' Vigorous enforcement of the en-
trenchment doctrine is thus viewed as an artificial impediment to
the efficient functioning of the market for capital assets.
As for the Clayton Act's concern with the political power of large
firms, which provides part of the foundation for section 7 and the
entrenchment doctrine, some of these commentators view the exis-
tence of such power as a myth, noting that organized small busi-
ness consistently has demonstrated more political influence than
has big business.226 Other commentators are less willing to chal-
lenge the legitimacy of the oft stated concern with political power,
but they are willing to relegate this concern to the field of political
science rather than economic science. In this manner, they excuse
themselves from the necessity of analyzing the political power
St. J., Aug. 27, 1981, at 12, col. 3 ("[Mr. Baxter] conceded that he wouldn't sue to block
reciprocal dealing between companies, which courts have ruled illegal."). Predatory or dis-
criminatory pricing is also illegal. See 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, 711a, at 150.
222. 5 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, 11 1103b, at 6-7; POSNER & EASTERBROOK,
supra note 30, at 511. A "toehold" acquisition involves the purchase of an insignificant fac-
tor in a market. From the standpoint of market impact, toehold acquisitions and internal
diversification may be treated as equivalent.
223. 5 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, 1 1103c, at 9-10.
224. PosNER & EASTERBROOK, supra note 30, at 940-42.
225. Id. at 942.
226. Id. at 938-40. Professor Posner adds that the success of the small business lobby
has been to the detriment of the economy.
[Vol. 13262
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problem in the context of conglomerate merger analysis, and they
infer that the courts should similarly refrain from embarking upon
such an analysis.2
That the critics tend to dismiss the political power underpin-
nings of the entrenchment doctrine leads to the first point in a
response to their critique. In short, their analysis is only one-di-
mensional; it focuses entirely on the issue of economic efficiency.
But there is just too much in the legislative history of section 7
and its amplification in unshakeable Supreme Court precedent to
dismiss the political and social concerns reflected in the statute.2 "
Recent experience with corporate political action committees, 29 in-
creasing use of the newly discovered first amendment protection
for corporate "advocacy" advertising,3 0 and a new propensity to
rely on corporate largess to support important public institu-
tions3 1 all tend to re-emphasize the relationship between economic
power and political and social power which has accounted for
much of the congressional purpose in enacting antitrust legisla-
tion.' An approach to merger analysis which restricts attention to
a transaction's effect on efficiency 33 does not comport with the
consistent judicial observation, uncontradicted in subsequent legis-
lation,28 ' that Congress expects the courts to view economic "de-
227. 5 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, 1 1142c, at 244-46; see note 203 supra and
accompanying text. See also White, supra note 1. ("The [economic] data [available]
...do not, and cannot address the question of whether there is a social-political problem
from the relative size of the largest companies in our economy.").
228. See notes 30-32 and 202-16 supra and accompanying text.
229. "In 1980, bpsiness PACs gave $35 million to Congressional candidates, nearly
tripling what labor gave." Miller, The Political Danger of New. Mega-Corporations, Wall St.
J., Aug. 20, 1981, at 24, col. 3 (southwest ed.). See also Grigot, Some Corporations Trying to
Turn Stockholders Into a Political Force, Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1982, at 27, col. 4 (southwest
ed.).
230. See Brodley, Limiting Conglomerate Mergers, supra note 58, at 873-74. See also
Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 102 S. Ct. 434 (1981) (First Amendment
prohibits enforcement of ordinance placing financial limits on contributions to committees
formed to support or oppose ballot measures submitted to popular vote).
231. See BUSINESS WEEK, July 6, 1981, at 26-27; NEWSWEEK, March 9, 1981, at 86; NEWs-
WEEK, October 5, 1981, at 26. See also Carey, Facing Cuts in Federal Grants, Big Schools
Try to Get Research Work from Business, Wall St. J., Feb. 9, 1982, at 27, col. 4 (southwest
ed.).
232. See notes 32 & 202-05 supra and accompanying text.
233. See, e.g., 4 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, T 904, at 11-14.
234. Congress has shown no reluctance to overrule or modify Supreme Court antitrust
opinions. See, e.g., Bank Merger Act Amendments of 1966, 80 Stat. 7 (1966), as amended, 12
U.S.C.A. § 1828(c) (1980) (responding to United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of
Lexington, 376 U.S. 665 (1964)); Newspaper Preservation Act, 84 Stat. 466 (1970), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1801-1804 (1976) (responding to Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131
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centralization" as a higher priority than economic efficiency in the
application of section 7.285 Until Congress reaches a new concensus
on the role of economic efficiency in section 7 analysis, the political
and social underpinnings of the anti-merger statute warrant con-
tinued emphasis on anti-concentration policy.
In any event, recent empirical data tend to confirm the en-
trenchment theory's prediction of restrictive effects on mobility
and entry within an industry resulting from the linkage of the ex-
tensive financial resources of conglomerate parents with leading
firms in concentrated markets.2 " In contrast, studies suggesting
(1969)); Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8a
et seq. (1976) (responding to judicial uncertainty as to the proper role of competition in the
partially regulated securities industry, as reflected in Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange,
366 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aft'd, 422 U.S. 659 (1975); Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York
Stock Exchange, 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971); and Kaplan
v. Lehman Bros., 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 954 (1967)). And yet,
Congress has failed to amend § 7 in a way that would instruct the Supreme Court to give
greater emphasis to efficiency considerations in § 7 analysis. Indeed, in recent years, Con-
gress has shown a propensity to strengthen § 7, not weaken it. See note 65 supra.
235. The Supreme Court, has noted that, "Congress appreciated that occasional higher
costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets.
It resolved these competing considerations in favor of de-centralization. We must give effect
to that decision." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). A year later,
the same point was articulated even more forcefully in Philadelphia Nat'l Bank:
We are clear ... that a merger the effect of which "may be substantially to lessen
competition" is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or eco-
nomic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial. A value choice of such
magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial competence, and in any event
has been made for us already, by Congress when it enacted the amended § 7.
Congress determined to preserve our traditionally competitive economy. It there-
fore proscribed anticompetitive mergers, the benign and the malignant alike, fully
aware, we must assume, that some price might have to be paid.
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963). See also United States
v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-76 (1966). This view was reiterated with respect to
conglomerates in Procter & Gamble: "Possible economies cannot be used as a defense to
illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers which lessen competition may also result
in economies, but it struck the balance in favor of protecting competition." FTC v. Procter
& Gamble, 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967). Cf. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337
U.S. 293, 309 (1949) (purported efficiency justifications present no affirmative defense to an
exclusive dealing contract unlawful under § 3 of the Clayton Act). See also note 207 supra.
Although these judicial interpretations of Congressional intent have been questioned by
some for being "unsupported," 4 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, 1 941b, at 153, the fact
remains that Congress has had twenty years to clarify its position and has not deemed it
necessary to do so. See note 234 supra. The opinions of the Supreme Court's "new antitrust
majority" have not questioned "the traditional rule that judges should not entertain affirma-
tive defences based on beneficial economies .. " Schneider, supra note 216, at 33.
236. Two recent studies support the predictions underlying the theory of entrenchment.
Having reviewed a wave of mergers in the book publishing industry, Professor Garvin, a
professor of economics at the Harvard Business School, concluded:
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that conglomerate acquisitions have not resulted in accelerated
concentration 87 fail adequately to consider the effects of such ac-
quisitions on deconcentration trends which might have accelerated
had the conglomerate mergers not occurred.28 8 Since section 7
Recent mergers in publishing have reinforced already existing trends in the indus-
try, threatening to further disadvantage the independent firms. Vertical integra-
tion has increased, and with it, the opportunities for vertical control. . . . Mean-
while, wealthy conglomerates have acquired a number of small publishers, raising
concern that their "long purses" will make it even more difficult for other firms to
gain access to bestsellers. Both entry and mobility barriers have been raised as a
result.
Garvin, Mergers and Competition in Book Publishing, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 327, 360 (1980).
Professor Garvin noted that the four-firm concentration level in trade book publishing actu-
ally declined during the period studied (1958-1972), but the eight-firm level increased dur-
ing the same period. Id. at 333, Table 1. Concentration ratios in other publishing sub-
markets showed inconsistent trends. Id. at 332-33. Despite these inconclusive concentration
trends, Professor Garvin reaches the quoted conclusion concerning the restructuring of this
industry on the basis of a merger trend which predominantly has been conglomerate in
nature. Id. at 350, 360-61.
The other study, co-authored by Professor Willard Mueller, made the following observa-
tion with respect to the domestic food retailing industry:
The findings provide strong confirmation of the hypothesis that large conglomer-
ate firms not only possess the power to restructure markets but that during the
period examined they succeeded in doing so. The finding that acquisitions. . . by
conglomerates increase concentration may surprise many, but they are consistent
with Dr. Stephen Rhoades' findings in banking.
Cotterill & Mueller, The Impact of Firm Conglomeration on Market Structure: Evidence
for the U.S. Food Retailing Industry, 25 ANrrrRusT BULL. 557, 581 (1980). Dr. Rhoades is
senior economist, Federal Reserve Board. Id. at 581 n.44.
Another observer has noted the ability of a firm with a heavily advertised brand name to
transfer consumer acceptance to new product markets, concluding that although the process
is not always successful, it is being used with increasing frequency. Abrams, Exploiting
Proven Brand Names Can Cut Risk of New Products, Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1981, at 25, col.
1. F. M. Scherer, in his widely approved text book, concludes: "All in all, the evidence points
toward a conclusion that economies of large-scale image differentiation and sales promotion
are substantial in at least a fair number of industries; and they may have contributed prom-
inently to rising market concentration." SCHEPER, supra note 1, at 116.
In conjunction with this growing body of evidence, one should consider the inability of
Purex Corp. to document any antitrust injury incurred as a result of the Procter & Gamble/
Clorox merger. See Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Corp., 419 F. Supp. 931 (C.D. Cal.
1976), rev'd, 596 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1979), appeal after remand, 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,422, at 75,072 (9th Cir. 1981). Purex's inability to prevail in this private suit was based on
its failure to carry the significant burden of proving that its particular business fortunes (as
opposed to competition generally) were affected by Procter & Gamble's illegal acquisition of
Clorox, 596 F. 2d at 889; 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 75,074-75. See note 218 supra.
237. See also Goldberg, The Effect of Conglomerate Mergers on Competition, 16 J. LAW
& EcoN. 127 (1973); White, supra note 1.
238. The Supreme Court endorsed this kind of "but for" analysis in FTC v. Consoli-
dated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 598-600 (1965), where post-acquisition evidence showed
that the acquired firm's market share of the dehydrated garlic market had declined by 12%
following the acquisition. The Court accepted the FTC's conclusion that the firm's market
266 Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 13
analysis of necessity focuses on probabilities,"3 9 there would appear
to be sufficient empirical verification of the entrenchment theory
to warrant the invocation of entrenchment analysis in appropriate
cases. It should be recalled that entrenchment analysis is called for
only when an acquiring firm is in a position to convey "unique ad-
vantages" to a leading firm in a concentrated market.240 That the
same "advantages" could be as dangerous to competition and con-
centration if they were exercised de novo through internal diversi-
fication rather than through an already established market leader
does not weaken the force of the entrenchment theory. The simple
answer is to paraphrase Chief Justice Marshall: "It is an an-
timerger statute which we are expounding. ' 241 If a merger or ac-
quisition will likely produce one of the effects proscribed by sec-
tion 7, Congress has declared it to be illegal-even if the same
share might have declined even further had it not been for the unfair leverage which Con-
solidated sought to exercise to benefit its new subsidiary. See also United States v. Philadel-
phia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 365 n.42 (1963) ("if c6ncentration is already great, the impor-
tance of preventing even slight increases in concentration and so preserving the possibility
of eventual deconcentration is correspondingly great .. "). Professors Areeda and Turner
suggest that the "but for" argument has more force in analyzing a horizontal merger than it
does with respect to a conglomerate one, since a conglomerate merger does not absolutely
reduce the number of firms in the market. 5 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, 1135d, at
218. If it can be shown, however, that a conglomerate acquisition is likely to raise entry
barriers in ways which would insulate part of the acquired firm's market share, the fact that
the abolute number of firms in the industry is unchanged does not reduce the reality of the
merger's effect on competition. Cf. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S.
293, 308-09 (Clayton Act's "effects" clause may be violated by conduct proscribed under § 3
even though defendant's conduct has not been shown to increase its share of the relevant
market, since "it is possible that [defendant's] position would have deteriorated but for the
adoption of [the illegal practice].") (emphasis added).
239. See notes 256-78 infra and notes 91, 94 & 215 supra and accompanying text.
240. See notes 157-72 supra and accompanying text.
241. This is a paraphrase of Chief Justice Marshall's timeless admonition that the first
canon of constitutional interpretation is to "never forget, that it is a constitution we are
expounding." McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819) (emphasis in original). His
point was that a constitution is necessarily broad and adaptable, "that only its great out-
lines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which
compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves." Id. A corol-
lary is that a constitution's "important objects" ought never to be diluted by loose interpre-
tation. It has often been suggested that the federal antitrust laws have "constitutional quali-
ties." The Supreme Court's statements to this effect are collected in Brodley, Limiting
Conglomerate Mergers, supra note 58, at 867 & n.2. If § 7 is accorded this constitutional
status, then it should be interpreted with both the flexibility and the fidelity to its "impor-
tant object" that Chief Justice Marshall would have us employ in constitutional interpreta-
tion. The "important object" of § 7 is unmistakable: it is to prevent the growth of economic
concentration insofar as that growth is attributable to mergers and acquisitions. It is no
coincidence that the popular name of the 1950 amendments to § 7 was the "Celler Anti-
Merger Act." 1950 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1792.
"Entrenchment" Under Section 7
effects might have been brought about by some other action of the
acquiring firm which Congress has not yet chosen to address.242 Ac-
tually, there appears to be sound reason for Congress' preference
that corporate growth come by way of internal expansion rather
than through acquisitions of independent firms. In an earlier day,
Professor Turner put the point this way:
[E]xpansion of a firm by merger is less competitive in its effects
than would be the corresponding expansion made by new invest-
ment. This is obvious: new investment adds to supply and capac-
ity; the merger does not immediately, though it may lead to such
addition in the long run.243
In addition to being economically preferable, the permissibility
of internal expansion as a diversification technique answers the
critics' concern about unnecessarily protecting inefficient firms
from takeover threats. Any sense of insulation which inefficient
managers might glean from a rule making conglomerate acquisi-
tions more difficult would be offset by the greater competition they
would encounter (or, at least, fear) if cash rich firms entered into
direct competition with them. The public would benefit from the
ensuing competitive battle for market share.244 The feasibility of
internal expansion as a mechanism to exploit economies of opera-
tion and as a check on inefficient markets should not be underesti-
mated.2 45 To the extent that capital is available to finance acquisi-
tions into beckoning markets, it should be available to finance
internal growth that is market justified.2 4'6 Furthermore, to tolerate
242. As the district court observed in Ford, if the same effects would follow internal
expansion, they would be legal not "because the result necessarily would have been com-
mendable, but simply because that course has not been proscribed." United States v. Ford
Motor Co., 286 F. Supp. 407, 441 (E.D. Mich. 1968), quoted with approval, Ford Motor Co.
v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 568 (1972).
243. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY, 135 (1959). See also Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 345 n.72 (1962).
244. See notes 222 & 243 supra and accompanying text.
245. Procter & Gamble Co. appears successfully to have adopted a toehold entry strat-
egy for its diversification program since it was rebuked in its Clorox acquisition. See P & G
Is Buying Ben Hill Griffin Citrus Business, Wall St. J., Aug. 19, 1981, at 12, col. 2 ("Ana-
lysts didn't consider Ben Hill Griffin's small size or its relative anonymity-its business is
mainly private label [processed fruit juice)-significant, saying that P & G's typical strategy
has been to simply get a toehold in a new business as a staging point."). A successful inter-
nal diversification program is reviewed in 'Johnson Wax' Puts Out More Than Wax, and It
Soon May Diversify Even Further, Wall St. J., Dec. 26, 1980, at 22, col. 1.
246. The capital markets appear to be more impersonal and objective than conglomerate
executives in their determinations of credit-worthy investments. Cf. 5 AREEDA & TURNER,
supra note 13, t 1108e, at 27 ("Some managers seem to value growth in assets and sales at
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conglomerate acquisitions which satisfy the conditions of the en-
trenchment formula on the ground that they serve to put inef-
ficient firms in more efficient hands would be in direct conflict with
the dispersal-of-economic-power rationale that underlies all of our
antitrust laws.24
In these troubled economic times, there is an understandable
tendency to view the shift from national to world markets as ne-
cessitating a re-interpretation of antitrust rules so that firms may
become financially strong on a global scale.24 8 But the studies on
economies of scale and the need to have highly concentrated indus-
tries in order to assure optimal efficiency (and thus optimal ability
to compete in world markets) remain inconclusive, whether the fo-
cus be on single-plant, multi-plant, or capital-raising economies. 49
Certainly, many examples of relatively small companies success-
fully competing against national and international giants can be
found.2 50 But even if it is true that optimally efficient firms cannot
coexist with de-concentrated domestic markets, it must be
remembered that a lessening of competition in one market has
never been held to be justified op the ground that it will lead to
enhanced competition in another market. 51 The language of sec-
the expense of profits."). A recent spate of voluntary divestitures by previously aggressive
conglomerates may be evidence of improvident acquisition programs embarked upon for
non-efficiency motivations. See ITT's Araskog Reverses Geneen Formula, Sheds Units to
Improve Company Fortunes, Wall St. J., April 1, 1981, at 31, col. 4; LTV Posts Rise in
Profit, Plans Spinoff of Wilson, Wall St. J., April 30, 1981, at 8, col. 2; Beatrice's Great
Expectations for Tropicana Tempered by Host of Unforeseen Problems, Wall St. J., Dec.
15, 1980, at 27, col. 1. Although these voluntary divestitures could be cited as proof that
markets do not develop as the entrenchment theory would predict, unsatisfactory profit
levels are not necessarily inconsistent with the entrenchment theory's prediction of in-
creased barriers to entry.
247. See note 201-06 supra and accompanying text. It may be true that proxy battles are
ineffective in weeding out bad management, see POSNER & EASTERBROOK, supra note 30, at
941-42, but it is not necessary to abandon the objectives of § 7 in order to improve stock-
holder control of internal corporate affairs. See, e.g., the proposal for federal legislation on
corporate governance in First, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of
1967, 117 U. PA. L. Rv. 861, 898 (1969).
248. See, e.g., MERGERS AND EcONOMIC EFFICIENCY, supra note 1, at 13 (statement of J.
Jasinowski, Ass't Sec'y for Policy, U.S. Dep't of Commerce); Landes & Posner, Market
Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARv. L. REv. 937, 963-74 (1981) (foreign production should
be taken into account more regularly in appraising the market power of merging domestic
firms); L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY 146 (1980).
249. See generally SCHERER, supra note 1, at 81-118. See also note 192 supra.
250. See, e.g., How Old-Line Jeans Producer Fashioned Survival Strategy, Wall St. J.,
May 4, 1981, at 29, col. 1.
251. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596, 611-12 (1972) (Brennan,
J., concurring); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963); cf.
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tion 7 has always proscribed mergers which promise a substantial
lessening of competition "in any line of commerce in any section of
the country."25 That a stronger economy or greater exports might
result if a merger otherwise violative of section 7's standard of ille-
gality were countenanced traditionally has been considered to be
irrelevant.5 3 Although the Supreme Court has recognized that sec-
tion 7 was designed for the "protection of competition, not com-
petitors,"54 it has also consistently viewed the kind of competition
which the Congress sought to protect as requiring "the protection
of viable, small, locally owned businesses. "255 Since entrenchment
analysis seeks to preserve that kind of competition, it remains an
appropriate tool for implementing the policies underlying section
7.
Entrenchment analysis examines the likely effects of a merger on
the market structure of a particular industry in order to provide a
reasoned prediction of the merger's effect on competition. This has
been shown to be consistent with the economic and social policies
underlying section 7. The remaining issue concerning the doc-
trine's legitimacy is whether, given the peculiarly predictive nature
of the doctrine, it is feasible to assess the substantiality of any an-
ticompetitive effects which the entrenchment theory might predict
in a given case.
ASSESSING THE SUBSTANTIALITY OF ENTRENCHMENT-INDUCED
EFFECTS
Problems of proof are ubiquitous in merger doctrine because of
the use of the subjunctive verb "may" in the effects clause of sec-
tion 7.11" The statute requires a prediction of not only the probable
United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656, 666-67 (1974) (bank merger's effects
must be analyzed in the markets where they operate primarily, regardless of broader ef-
fects). But see Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania Corp., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (enhancement of
interbrand competition is relevant in assessing the reasonableness of any elimination of in-
trabrand competition in applying rule of reason analysis to non-price vertical distribution
restraints imposed by manufacturers on dealers).
252. The language of the original § 7 is set out in note 17 supra; the language of the
current § 7 is found in note 8 supra.
253. See note 235 supra and accompanying text.
254. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (emphasis in original).
255. Id. at 344. See also United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 274-76 (1966).
For a brief description of the economic and social impact mergers can have on a community,
see Byrne, Takeovers Drain Milwaukee,.Crimping the Support Firms, Wall St. J., Sept. 15,
1981,'at 25, col. 1 (southwest ed.). See also United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S.
526, 543 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
256. See generally United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963);
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future effect a merger will have on competition, but the substanti-
ality of that effect as well.2 57 A plaintiff need not show that sub-
stantial adverse effects on competition are certain; "probabilities,"
to be distinguished from "ephemeral possibilities," will suffice. 5
Attempts to further refine this subjective standard have been un-
successful.2" In applying the "probability test," the Supreme
Court historically has been guided by its understanding of the con-
gressional intent in section 7 "[to arrest] mergers at a time when
the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of commerce was
still in its incipiency . . . [and thus] to brake this force at its out-
set and before it gathered momentum." 2 0 This has led the Court
to accept reasonable predictions of anti-competitive consequences
without elaborate proof as to the "probability" that the alleged ad-
verse consequences would in fact occur, or that the alleged conse-
quences would be "substantial" if they did occur. The Court has
indicated that to require more certain predictions would frustrate
the "incipiency" standard built into the Act.""
Bok, supra note 202; Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers, supra note 59 at 8-9; Turner,
supra note 49, at 1318-19.
257. The statutory standard for illegality is whether "the effect of [a] merger may be
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)
(amended 1980). Application of this standard "necessarily requires a prediction of the
merger's impact on competition, present and future." F.T.C. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386
U.S. 568, 577 (1967). The required prediction is no different for conglomerate mergers than
it is for horizontal mergers. Id. See note 251 supra and accompanying text.
258. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962). See notes 91, 94 & 215
supra and accompanying text.
259. In Marine Bancorporation, the "new antitrust majority" reminded Justice Marshall
of his earlier articulation of the standard as being whether a lessening of competition is
"sufficiently probable and imminent" to warrant condemnation. United States v. Marine
Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 623 n.22 (1974). Despite their agreement on the stan-
dard, the nine Justices split five to four on its application. The majority found the govern-
ment's case to be "considerably closer to 'ephemeral possibilities' than to 'probabilities.'"
Id. at 623.
260. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962).
261. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), where the Court
found it desirable to design a test which "lightens the burden of proving illegality ... with
respect to mergers whose size makes them inherently suspect in light of Congress' design in
§ 7 to prevent undue concentration." Id. at 363. Although Philadelphia National Bank was
a horizontal merger case, a similarly "light burden has been imposed in vertical and con-
glomerate cases." See United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170-72, 174-77
(1964) (conglomerate); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 233 F. Supp. 718, 729-30
(E.D. Mo. 1964), aff'd per curiam, 382 U.S. 12 (1965) (vertical). Congress' apparent willing-
ness to sacrifice some economic efficiency if necessary to achieve its pro-competition/anti-
accumulation-of-power objectives supports the Court's construction of the statutory stan-
dard. See notes 201-05 & 235 supra and accompanying text. Since antitrust law does not
prohibit a firm's exercise and enjoyment of real efficiency advantages in a program of inter-
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This is not to suggest that the "substantiality" question should
be resolved by an intuitive reaction against large mergers. But any
case satisfying all four elements of the entrenchment theory26 2 will
likely involve a very large firm s seeking to acquire a leading firm
in an already concentrated industry. In such a setting, virtually
any adverse effect on competitive relationships within the affected
industry could be qualitatively "substantial," since competitive
conditions in such an industry prior to the acquisition would have
been unhealthy. " 4 Any existing or potential competition within an
oligopolistic market warrants special protection.2 5 By focusing at-
tention on the pre-existing quality of competition in the acquired
firm's industry and, perhaps, the historical trend toward concen-
tration in that industry, 6 courts may find a benchmark against
which to appraise the significance of the effects which are pre-
dicted to follow a challenged acquisition.
If the acquired firm is already dominant in an oligopolistic in-
dustry, as in Procter & Gamble,6 any incremental advantages
conferred on that firm might properly be considered qualitatively
substantial. The incremental barriers to entry generated by such
an acquisition would threaten a substantial reduction of competi-
nal diversification and expansion, there is little risk that society will be deprived of the
benefits attributable to a firm's efficiency if an acquisition it proposes is prohibited. See
notes 243-47 supra and accompanying text. On the other hand, if a merger which is reasona-
bly likely to aggravate concentration trends in a given industry is permitted, there is consid-
erable risk that society will experience some of the deleterious consequences which Congress
associated with the growth of private economic power. The more recent merger opinions of
the Supreme Court's "new antitrust majority" are not to the contrary. See notes 213-16 &
235 supra and accompanying text.
262. The four elements involve (1) the acquisition of a leading firm in a concentrated
industry (2) by a firm capable of conveying an "unfair advantage" upon the acquired firm,
with (3) the advantage being unique in the acquired firm's industry, so that (4) it reasonably
may be predicted that actual or potential competitors will be intimidated from competing
aggressively against the newly acquired firm. See notes 157-95 supra and accompanying
text.
263. The acquiring firm conceivably could be less than giant in size. See notes 165, 174-
77 supra and accompanying text.
264. See notes 208-09 supra and accompanying text. Of course, the court would still
have to be satisfied that there is a reasonable probability that adverse effects will occur.
265. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 365 n.42 (1963).
266. While the court must attempt to predict the effect of a merger in light of the proba-
ble future development of an industry, United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S.
486 (1974), past trends and conditions are relevant to that analysis. See Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States,'370 U.S. 294, 332-33, 344-46 (1962).
267. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). See notes 76-77 supra and
accompanying text.
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tive vitality in that market.2 But even if the acquired firm is not
substantially larger than the other firms in its industry, and even if
the acquired firm's industry is not exceptionally concentrated, the
likelihood that other firms within the industry would also pursue a
course of acquisitions might substantially worsen the prospects for
competition in that industry.2 9 Because of the first acquisition, the
industry might seem measurably more likely to become or remain
the kind of oligopoly that section 7 was intended to retard. 70
A noticeable trend toward concentration within an industry may
also establish with greater certainty the substantiality of likely en-
trenchment effects. This principle is well established in horizontal
and vertical merger cases, 271 and it would seem equally relevant to
conglomerate merger analysis. In non-conglomerate cases, analysis
normally is directed toward the acquired firm's industry, although
in vertical cases the relevant line of commerce may be that of ei-
ther the acquired or the acquiring firm.72 Similarly, conglomerate
merger analysis usually will focus on the market in which the ac-
quired firm competes, although, as with vertical mergers, anticom-
petitive effects in any market in which the acquiring firm competes
may establish a violation of section 7. 278 But even if the focus is
268. See General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 946 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 919 (1968). See also notes 116-21 supra and accompanying text.
269. See text accompanying notes 189-94 & 210-11, discussing "triggering effect."
270. The Third Circuit in General Foods seems to have taken this view. The court em-
phasized how the acquisition of S.O.S. Company would transform the soap pad industry
from a closely balanced duopoly to either a dominant/subservient oligopoly arrangement or,
if the other duopolist sought a protective merger, a doubly entrenched duopoly arrange-
ment. General Foods Corp. v. F.T.C., 386 F.2d 936, 945-46 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 919 (1968).
271. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 332, 345-46 (1962).
272. Compare, e.g., Reynolds Metals Co. v. F.T.C., 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (focus
on acquired firm's market), with United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S.
586 (1957) (focus on the acquiring firm's market).
273. In Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974), Justice Powell stated: "[In no pre-
vious §7 case has the Court determined the legality of a merger by measuring its effects on
areas where the acquired firm is not a direct competitor." Id. at 621. This statement appar-
ently overlooks United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957), as well
as United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). Perhaps Justice Powell
intended to limit his statement to banking cases. It also appears that Justice Powell's un-
willingness to consider effects in markets in which the acquired firm did not compete was
premised as much on a failure of proof as on unacceptability of the theory. Justice Powell
stated:
There has been no persuasive showing that the effect of the merger on a state-
wide basis may be substantially to lessen competition within the meaning of §7
... . To assume, on the basis of essentially no evidence, that the challenged
merger will tend to produce a statewide linkage of oligopolies is to espouse a per
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strictly on the acquired firm's industry, if that industry is exper-
iencing a trend toward concentration, that aspect of entrenchment
theory which focuses on the entrenchment of the industry gener-
ally2 74 would take on special significance in assessing the substanti-
ality of the effects of the acquisition. By the same token, if the
acquired firm's industry is experiencing or is likely to experience a
wave of takeovers by conglomerate firms, the more recent stud-
ies2 7 5 suggest that the rapid fire replacement of previously single-
industry oligopolists by multi-industry conglomerates may produce
a substantially less competitive industry.276 The tendency of a
merger to contribute to the entrenchment of already obtained con-
centration levels in an oligopolistic industry might reasonably be
accorded more significance than the absolute percentage gains in
concentration attributable to that merger would suggest.
A final question on the substantiality issue is whether any incre-
mental lessening of competition attributable to a merger's en-
trenchment effects should be aggregated with other types of com-
petitive impact predicted to accompany a merger. In view of the
incipiency standard built into section 7, aggregation of probable
effects would seem to be justified. Where the task is to draw
lines between probabilities and possibilities, two or more credible
theories might warrant a conclusion that the combined effects
would have a "substantial" effect on competition, especially if
se rule against market extension mergers like the one at issue here.
418 U.S. at 622-23. It is possible that a more persuasive record could be produced today, as
economists continue to explore the theory of conglomerate power and interdependence. See
note 236 supra and accompanying text. There is reason to believe the Supreme Court would
not lightly dismiss a more compelling record. See notes 144-56 supra and accompanying
text.
274. See notes 97-98 supra and accompanying text.
275. See note 236 supra and accompanying text.
276. See notes 189-94 & 236 supra and accompanying text. This argument is distin-
guishable from that rejected by the district court in United States v. International Tel. &
Tel. Co., 324 F. Supp. 19, 51-54 (D. Conn. 1970), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971). See
notes 52-54 supra and accompanying text. There, the government was contending that the
mergers contributed to rising aggregate concentration without reference to any particular
industry. In comparison, the theory of conglomerate interdependence is capable of focusing
on the acquired firm's particular industry, looking for any recent increase in concentration
or oligopolistic behavior that may be attributable to the absorption of the industry into the
hands of conglomerate firms.
277. Commissioner Elman advocated this approach in his dissent to the FTC's opinion
in General Foods, 69 F.T.C. 380 (1966), suggesting that his opinion for the Commission in
Procter & Gamble, 63 F.T.C. 1465 (1963) had employed this approach. See notes 108 & 116
supra and accompanying text.
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competition in the market is already impaired.2 78
A PROPOSAL FOR A MORE SENSITIVE ANALYSIS OF ENTRENCHMENT
EFFECTS IN CONGLOMERATE MERGER CASES
Periods of heightened merger activity tend to generate legislative
proposals which would establish presumptions of illegality based
upon the size of the participating firms or some other quantitative
formulae.2 79 One frequently advanced proposal would attack the
acquisition of a leading firm in a concentrated market by a "large"
firm.2 80 There are obvious practical obstacles to articulating 8 ' and
then enactings8 2 such a legal standard. Unlike these proposals,
however, revival of the entrenchment doctrine would require no
legislative action. The revival of entrenchment analysis as an effec-
tive approach for assessing the competitive impact of conglomerate
mergers merely requires a recommitment to the principles enunci-
ated by the Supreme Court in the mid-1960's, principles which
were sensitive to the legislative policy of arresting in its incipiency
any trend toward concentration or reduced competition in an
industry. 8 '
Under the entrenchment analysis advocated here, mergers would
not be condemned merely because the firms involved were large
and there existed a trend toward aggregate concentration in the
economy. Illegality would be premised on a reasonable assessment
of probable changes in competitive relationships within an identifi-
able market due to a specific merger. The analysis would be no
more conjectural than classical horizontal and vertical merger anal-
278. An approach allowing the aggregation of effects predicted by the various § 7 theo-
ries would be most relevant in product extension and market extension cases, in which a
combined analysis under both the potential competition doctrine and the entrenchment
doctrine is particularly appropriate.
Although Professors Areeda and Turner have rejected this aggregation approach, 5
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 13, 1147, at 264-74, the Supreme Court has not yet had an
opportunity to express an opinion on it. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967),
was not treated by the Court as an aggregation case. See notes 81 & 92-96 supra and accom-
panying text. The ITT cases, in which the Government's case relied partially on the aggre-
gation of effects, were settled while pending on appeal. See note 54 supra and accompanying
text. Marine Bancorporation involved only the potential competition theory. United States
v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 623 n.23 (1974).
279. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
280. See, e.g., S. 600, § 2(c), 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); 'NEAL REPORT, supra note 64.
281. See generally Baker & Grimm, supra note 42.
282. See notes 49-65 supra and accompanying text.
283. See notes 17-32, 91, 94, 215, 235 & 260-61 supra and accompanying text.
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"Entrenchment" Under Section 7
ysis.284 As in those areas, entrenchment analysis would call for
courts to look not simply at the likely future of the acquired firm,
to see if it may become more dominant, but also at the acquired
firm's industry as a whole, to see whether there might be a proba-
ble substantial lessening of competition in that industry. Dis-
turbing entrenchment effects could be shown even without predict-
ing either the creation of one overly dominant firm or a significant
increase in concentration in the acquired firm's industry. The en-
trenchment doctrine of the 1960's has been found here not neces-
sarily to be confined to "entrenchment-of-the-dominant-firm"
or "disproportionate resources/giant-among-pygmies" situations.
2 85
Section 7 of the Clayton Act is as surely violated if a non-competi-
tive market structure in an entire industry becomes entrenched
because of a merger as it is when a single, already dominant firm in
an industry becomes entrenched. Hopefully, the courts-and the
enforcement agencies-will learn to recognize both situations. To
do so would only do justice to the deconcentration policy which
Congress consistently has pursued in its merger control
legislation. 8 6
The proposal here is simply to bring the incipiency concern to
the same level of importance in conglomerate merger analysis that
it traditionally has been accorded in horizontal and vertical merger
analysis. Significantly, the entrenchment analysis advocated here
would provide an avenue for examining pure conglomerate mergers
not otherwise assailable under traditional theories.287 There is no
reason why all of the conditions required to invoke the entrench-
ment doctrine could not exist and be demonstrated in a non-mar-
ket extension or product extension situation.28 8
CONCLUSION
The task upon which this article embarked was to consider
whether the entrenchment doctrine might be revived as a coherent,
economically defensible theory under which a significant number
or class of conglomerate mergers might be shown to violate the "ef-
284. See notes 33-37 & 212 supra and accompanying text.
285. See notes 97-98 supra and accompanying text.
286. See notes 201-12 supra and accompanying text.
287. See notes 54-60 & 167 supra and accompanying text.
288. Although the pure conglomerate transaction narrows the range of possible advan-
tages that might be conveyed by the acquiring firm to the acquired firm, capital advantages
certainly could be found in many pure conglomerate transactions. On the significance of
capital advantages, see SCHERER, supra note 1, at 104-08.
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fects" clause of existing section 7. The entrenchment doctrine was
found to be capable of identifying suspect acquisitions when the
following four conditions simultaneously obtain: (1) the acquired
firm is a leading firm in a concentrated industry, s9 (2) the acquir-
ing company is in a position to bestow upon the acquired firm a
previously unavailable significant competitive advantage,2 90 (3) the
competitive advantage is not available (except through merger) to
the other firms in the acquired firm's industry,29 ' and (4) the com-
petitive advantage reasonably can be expected to alter competitive
relationships so as to dampen competitive attitudes displayed in
the acquired firm's industry (by increasing oligopolistic behavior
and/or heightening barriers to entry).292 Adverse treatment of en-
trenchment effects was found to be appropriate in view of the leg-
islative policies underlying section 7 and related antitrust laws.293
Finally, several factors were suggested which would be helpful in
appraising the substantiality of any entrenchment-induced effects
in a case by case analysis. 94 Several of the very recent "mega-
mergers" would appear to be candidates for the proposed en-
trenchment analysis. 29 5 The cases which might be reached under
the formula set out here would include many of those acquisitions
which various legislative proposals have recommended should be
proscribed under a "large firm/leading firm" prohibition,2" but
without the need for additional legislation.
Professor Bork has said that the "congealing of the economy"
into a few corporate hands is merely a "hobgoblin" that "never
comes to pass. "297 One might wonder whether the current merger
wave is different in kind than any in the past, and about the cost,
in terms of all of the values underlying federal antitrust policy, if
we should discover a few years from now, say on the one-hun-
dredth anniversary of the passage of the Sherman Act, that the
hobgoblin was real after all. Perhaps employment of entrenchment
analysis will help to assure that these fears are never realized.
289. See notes 152-62 supra and accompanying text.
290. See notes 163-72 supra and accompanying text.
291. See notes 173-77 supra and accompanying text.
292. See notes 178-95 supra and accompanying text.
293. See notes 197-255 supra and accompanying text.
294. See notes 256-78 supra and accompanying text.
295. The Societe National Elf Acquitaine/Texas Gulf, Standard Oil (Ohio)/Kennecott,
Fluor/St. Joe Minerals, and Standard Oil (California)/Amax mergers, involving an aggregate
of $9.9 billion, all raise substantial entrenchment issues. See note 4 supra.
296. See notes 64 & 279 supra and accompanying text.
297. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 202 (1978).
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